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Reproducing Dignity: Race, Disability, and Reproductive Controls
Mary Crossley*

Introduction
Women’s reproductive rights are under widespread assault. Descriptions of this assault
often focus on restraints on women’s ability to access contraception or abortion—on their
freedom and ability to avoid bearing children. Equally destructive of women’s reproductive
freedom, however, are impediments to some women’s ability to bear children. Black women and
women with disabilities have experienced numerous constraints on their freedom to form and
maintain families, as other scholars have noted. Rarely explored, however, are parallels between
the experiences regarding childbearing of women in these two groups. This Article fills that void.
Of course, race and disability are not completely separated categories. Blacks experience
disability at higher rates than do Whites;1 for many women, Blackness and disability are

*

Professor of Law and John E. Murray Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. My thanks go to
the Derrick Bell Fund for Excellence at Pitt Law for supporting this project and for furthering the legacy of
Professor Derrick Bell. The project benefited from valuable comments by Leslie Francis, Lisa Ikemoto, Robyn
Powell, Lu-in Wang, and Ruqaiijah Yearby. I also thank Praneeta Govil, Krista Grobelny Ebbert, and Taylor Smith
for their dedicated and helpful research assistance. All errors are my own.
1

CDC, Adults with Disabilities: Ethnicity and Race,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/materials/infographic-disabilities-ethnicity-race.html (reporting
that 1 in 4 Black adults and 1 in 5 White adults have a disability). Poverty is highly correlated with both race and
disability. See Nanette Goodman et al., Financial Inequality: Disability, Race and Poverty in America, NATIONAL
DISABILITY INSTITUTE (2017), https://www.nationaldisabilityinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/disabilityrace-poverty-in-america.pdf. In addition, women are more likely to report a disability than are men, CDC,
Prevalence of Disability and Disability Type Among Adults, United States—2013,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/features/key-findings-community-prevalence.html.
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overlapping identities.2 These women have likely faced even greater burdens in seeking to have
children.3 Two stories begin to suggest the parallels the Article will examine.
Mary Moe
In 2011 the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health petitioned a court to appoint the
parents of a 32-year-old pregnant woman (known in court documents as “Mary Moe”) as her
temporary guardians because she had a psychiatric disability. The medication recommended to
treat Mary’s condition risked harm to the developing fetus, and her parents sought authorization
to consent to an abortion. Despite Mary’s expressed objection to abortion on religious grounds

Language choices in writing about race and disability matter. In this Article, I generally use “Black” rather than
“African American” because not all persons who experience anti-black racism are either African or American.
Choices of language about disability must also be made:
2

The global disability rights movement is divided on whether to use the term “disabled people” or
“people with disabilities.” The latter term is consistent with the “people-first” terminology adopted
by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and is generally preferred by
disability rights activists in the United States. . . . However, . . . others within the disability rights
movement prefer the term “disabled people” as a political identification, and feel that this
terminology more accurately reflects the structural barriers to social inclusion as the main
problem, rather than the impairment itself.
Center for Reproductive Rights, Shifting the Frame on Disability Rights for the U.S. Reproductive Rights Movement
3 (2017), https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Disability-Briefing-PaperFINAL.pdf. In light of this division within the disability rights movement, this Article generally follows the
preference for “people-first” terminology but also uses “disabled people” language in some instances. Finally, in
recognition of the prevalence of overlapping identities, I use the phrase “Black and disabled women” to include
Black women who are not disabled, disabled women who are not Black, and women who are both Black and
disabled.
3

Research on the childbearing experiences of who are both Black and disabled remains limited. One study,
however, found that women with intellectual or developmental disabilities who delivered babies were more likely to
be Black and were more likely to experience adverse birth outcomes. Ilhom Akobirshoev, Birth Outcomes Among
US Women with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 10 DISABILITY & HEALTH J. 406 (2017). Slightly more
attention has been paid to women who are both Black and disabled who are already mothers. See Angela Frederick,
Visibility, Respectability, and Disengagement: The Everyday Resistance of Mothers with Disabilities, 181 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 131 (2017)(suggesting that motherhood is an act of defiance against cultural assumptions of maternal role
unfitness); Anna Hinton, Making Do with What You Don’t Have: Disabled Black Motherhood in Octavia’s Parable of
the Sower and Parable of the Talents, 12 J. LITERARY & CULTURAL DISABILITIES STUDIES 441 (2018)(connecting the “strong
black woman” and “supercrip” stereotypes).
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and without a hearing, the judge ordered that Mary’s parents be appointed as her guardians,
suggesting that they might trick her to going to the hospital for the abortion if needed. But the
judge didn’t stop there. Of her own accord and without any notice, she ordered the medical
facility that performed the abortion to sterilize Mary “to avoid this painful situation from
recurring in the future.”4
Marshae Jones
In December 2018, Marshae Jones lost a pregnancy at five months. Losing a pregnancy
can be profoundly difficult for a woman; a significant number of women experience depression,
anxiety, or even post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), conditions that may be disabling.5 For
Jones, a Black woman, however, losing her pregnancy resulted in a manslaughter indictment. An
Alabama grand jury charged her with causing the death of her own fetus after another woman
shot Jones in the belly during a fight. Jones’ alleged crime, for which the penalty could have
been years in prison, was provoking a fight with the other woman, who pulled a gun in selfdefense. A local police officer summed up the rationale: “The investigation showed that the only
true victim in this was the unborn baby . . . . It was the mother of the child who initiated and
continued the fight which resulted in the death of her own unborn baby.”6 Ultimately, the district

Guardianship of Mary Moe, 960 N.E.2d 350, 352 (2012). Mary Moe appealed the trial court’s orders, and the
Massachusetts appellate court reversed the order of sterilization and vacated the order that Moe undergo an abortion
and remanded the case “for a proper evidentiary inquiry and decision on the issue of substituted judgment.” Id.
4

5

Cf. D. Horesh et al., To Lose an Unborn Child: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder
Following Pregnancy Loss Among Israeli Women, 53 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 95 (2018); J. Farren et al., The
Psychological Impact of Early Pregnancy Loss, 24 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 731 (2018).
6

Carol Robinson, Alabama woman loses unborn child after being shot, gets arrested; shooter goes free, AL.com
(June 26, 2019), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/2019/06/woman-indicted-in-shooting-death-of-her-unbornchild-charges-against-shooter-dismissed.html.
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attorney decided to dismiss the case, describing it as “disturbing and heartbreaking” and
concluding that prosecuting Jones would not be “in the best interest of justice.”7
These two stories may appear to have little in common. Both accounts, though,
demonstrate how the law, by giving effect to long-standing social biases, can operate to express
disrespect for Black women and women with disabilities8 who are pregnant or seeking to become
mothers. They are but two examples of indignity heaped upon pregnant women9 who deviate
from ideals of motherhood—indignity in the form of intrusions on autonomy, invasions of the
body, and denial of individual worth.
Many of the constraints on childbearing that this Article describes have their roots in the
history of overt eugenics laws in the United States, which operated against both Blacks and
people with disabilities. Several of the contemporary policies that I describe reflect a more covert
eugenic spirit. Not only do Black women and women with disabilities face distinctive and
parallel barriers to becoming pregnant, but once they achieve pregnancy, both groups face more
perils associated with pregnancy and childbirth. Finally, Black women and women with

Carol Robinson, Marshae Jones will not be tried for manslaughter in unborn baby’s death, DA says, AL.com
(July 3, 2019), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/2019/07/marshae-jones-will-not-be-tried-for-manslaughter-inunborn-babys-death-da-says.html.
7

8

To be sure, other persons—immigrants, persons who identify as LGBTQ, and women of color more broadly—also
are subjected to these indignities. By narrowing my focus, I do not mean to discount their experiences or suggest
they do not parallel and intersect with in important ways the experiences of people with disabilities and Black
people. I decided to examine the specific experiences of Black women and women with disabilities in order to
permit some focus and because of how striking I found the parallels in their experiences. Similarly, the Article
focuses on Black women, not the broader group of “women of color,” because—despite sharing many concerns with
women in the broader category—Black women in the United States have a distinctive history, which has generated
distinctive contemporary concerns.
9

Not all persons who can become pregnant identify as women. Transgender men and non-binary or gender
nonconforming individuals may become pregnant. This Article’s analysis is framed in terms of cisgender women.
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disabilities who become mothers face greater risks of losing their children to a child welfare
system that views them as deficient mothers.10
Relying on concepts of dignity found in human rights law and United States
constitutional law, this Article argues that these barriers to bearing children and forming healthy
and secure families insult the dignity of Black women and women with disabilities. While the
definition of “dignity” is frustratingly imprecise, its connotations are rich and multi-faceted.
They provide a conceptual focus for the parallel harms experienced by women for whom law and
policies make it difficult or dangerous to become a mother. These affronts to dignity are
inconsistent with an understanding of Black women and women with disabilities as inherently
worthy and fully human.
To be sure, the differences in the historical and contemporary experiences of Black
women and women with disabilities are many. But appreciating how the indignities they
experience parallel one another may help coalesce their support for reproductive justice. The
reproductive justice (RJ) movement, which gained force in the 1990s as a movement led by
feminist, activist women of color, embraces three central values: the right not to have a child
(access to contraception and abortion), the right to have a child, and the right to parent that
child.11 RJ’s emergence reflected the dissatisfaction of women of color with the predominantly

10

Cf. Robyn M. Powell & Michael Ashley Stein, Persons with Disabilities and the Sexual, Reproductive, and
Parenting Rights: An International and Comparative Analysis, 11 FRONTIERS OF L. IN CHINA 53, 59 (2016) (“the
ideology undergirding eugenic sterilization continues to curtail sexual, reproductive, and parenting rights of persons
with disabilities”).
11

See generally JAEL SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE
JUSTICE (2d ed. 2016); Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 327 (2013)
(citing to LORETTA J. ROSS, UNDERSTANDING REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE (2006)); Kimala Price, What is Reproductive
Justice?: How Women of Color Activists are Redefining the Pro-Choice Paradigm, 10 MERIDIANS 42, 43 (2010).
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White pro-choice movement’s focus on abortion rights and liberal feminists’ emphasis of
autonomy-based understandings of choice.12 In contrast, RJ attends to the historical and societal
structures that have denied women—particularly poor women and women of color—the
political, economic, and social power and resources necessary to make decisions about
reproduction and family.
The rhetoric of reproductive justice activists and theorists emphasizes intersectionality in
the experiences of women who have been marginalized. Kimberlé Crenshaw’s original insights
regarding intersectional experiences addressed the law’s failure to recognize the dual and
mutually reinforcing dimensions of workplace discrimination to which plaintiffs who were both
female and Black were subjected.13 The past three decades have witnessed the expansion of
intersectional thinking as a mode of considering how the multiple facets of a person’s identity
interact to affect her experience, as well as illuminating how interconnected systems of power
and control regulate women’s lives.14 Although intersectional theory and rhetoric sometimes

Luna & Luker, supra note 11, at 335 (describing the emergence of “a critique of (middle-class) able-bodied White
women’s presumption that their experience adequately represented all women’s experiences”). This critique, as
expressed by Jael Silliman, Marlene Gerber Fried, Loretta Ross, and Elena R. Gutierrez, leaders in the RJ
movement, emphasizes the lived context for reproductive decisions:
12

A sole focus on abortion is separated from the lives and daily concerns of most women. While a
low-income woman may have one or two abortions in her life, she also must deal with poor,
unsafe housing, inept medical care, lack of health insurance, pay inequities, and a host of other
issues on an ongoing basis. Severing abortion from these day-to-day concerns casts the pro-choice
movements as overprivileged, elitist, and insensitive to the realities of many women’s lives.
SILLIMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 295.
13

Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
See Luna & Luker, supra note 11, at 329 (describing “an interconnected system … [that] regulates people’s
reproductive futures through assessments of worthiness originating in assumptions about race, class, and disability
(among other dimensions)”).
14
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encompass the role of disability, a fuller exploration of the parallels and intersections between
the lived realities of women with disabilities and Black women relating to childbearing may
serve to foster great solidarity.15 Fostering alliances and growing the communities that RJ
advocates for may produce progress toward specific policy and material goals. Moreover,
increasing solidarity may itself enhance the dignity of women who increasingly value one
another’s shared humanity.
The history of reproduction in the United States is replete with examples of
discrimination and oppression. For example, eugenically inspired immigration controls in place
from the early twentieth century to today have affected Latina and Asian women, and Native
American women and women in Puerto Rico have also suffered involuntary sterilizations.16
While the broadly constituted group “women of color” shares many similar experiences, specific
racial and ethnic groups also have distinctive histories and face distinctive prejudices. This
Article focuses on the distinctive experiences of Black women and disabled women17 as
examples in order to highlight the need to examine the commonality and intersectionality of

15

Cf. Dara Shifrer & Angela Frederick, Disability at the Intersections, 13 SOCIOLOGY COMPASS e12733
(2019)(suggesting sociologists have not adequately considered disability as an axis of stratification). I am not the
first to recognize the similarities, as well as the divergences, between the concerns advanced by the reproductive
justice movement and those of the disability rights movement. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability and
Reproductive Justice, 14 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2020) (“Just as ‘regulating Black women’s
reproductive decisions ha[s] been a central aspect of racial oppression in America,’ regulating disabled people’s
reproductive decision has been a central aspect of disability oppression in America.”); Politically Correct Eugenics,
12 FIU L. REV. 51 (2016); Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality: The Case of Race,
Gender, Disability, and Genetic Technologies, 10 DUBOIS REV. 313 (2013); Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics of
Abortion, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 587, 589 (2017) (“Reproductive justice should include a commitment to adequate
funding for the programs on which disabled adults and children depend, as well as the removal of perverse legal
incentives that discourage disabled Americans from taking steps that would make employment more realistic.”).
See, e.g., ELENA R. GUTIERREZ, FERTILE MATTERS: THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN-ORIGIN WOMEN’S REPRODUCTION
(2008); see also SILLIMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 16.
16

17

Despite its focus on Black women and disabled women, the Article does not claim to represent the experience of
all Black and disabled women. Neither group is a monolith. Women’s experiences are diverse. But the fact that
women in these groups disproportionately experience constraints on childbearing deserves noting and exploring.
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women’s experiences across boundaries of identity. Additionally, although this Article focuses
on how Black and disabled women’s ability to have children is controlled, that ability is only one
aspect of their reproductive liberty. Equally important is the freedom to choose not to have
children, but the freedom to avoid childbearing lies beyond this Article’s scope.
This Articles taps into the rich scholarly literature on how laws, policies, and practices
constrain childbearing and motherhood by Black women and women with disabilities. It explores
how those constraints operate in parallel fashion and at times intersect. Without question, my
project depends on the work of others whose deep focus on particular instances of constraint
enables me to step back and examine the landscape for similar features. More particularly, as an
abled, White woman, I am deeply indebted to those scholars, advocates, and activists who are
members of marginalized groups and who have brought their lived experience to bear on these
issues. My intent is not to compare or equate the experience of one group with another. The
historical experiences or contemporary indignities endured by Black women and disabled
women are not the same, and comparisons to assess whose disadvantage has been worse (the
“oppression Olympics”) seem unlikely to advance the cause of dignity and justice for both
groups. Rather, my purpose in undertaking this project is to bring together prior research and
build on it to highlight the potential for greater coalition building – in the words of columnist
Jonathan Capehart, to help “build a bridge of empathy, openness and awareness”18 that could
support greater solidarity.

18

Jonathan Capehart, What Pete Buttigieg Really Said About Being Gay, Prejudice and Blacks, WASH. POST
(Dec. 3, 2019, 6:00 AM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/03/what-mayor-pete-really-saidabout-being-gay-prejudiceblacks/?utm_campaign=post_most&utm_medium=Email&utm_source=Newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1.
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Part I of the Article lays the foundation for this examination by describing Eugenics-era
laws and policies that asserted public health justifications for preventing reproduction by certain
groups. Part II explores a series of realms where eugenically inspired barriers to childbearing by
Black women and women with disabilities persist. To tease out parallels in those women’s
experience, Part II focuses particularly on biological interference (sterilization and
contraception), impediments created by welfare and criminal justice policies, and barriers to
accessing assisted reproduction technologies. Part II also considers the devalued motherhood of
Black women and women with disabilities who become pregnant and have children. That
devaluation is apparent in the ways that women in these groups face pregnancies that are
disproportionately perilous and motherhood that is disproportionately precarious. Part III
examines the parallels in the experiences of Black women and disabled women through the lens
of dignity, probing how the previously described barriers to bearing and raising children violate
their dignity. Part IV sketches out how appreciating the parallels described in this Article might
contribute to both theoretical vigor and enhanced social movement solidarity among advocates
for reproductive justice. Part V will briefly conclude.
I. Historical Parallels: Eugenics-Era Controls on Reproduction
The contemporary infringements on the freedom to have children experienced by Black
and disabled women have historic roots in the Eugenics movement that flourished in the United
States in the early twentieth century. Without attempting to provide a full description of the
Eugenics movement,19 this Part highlights how that movement foreshadowed the situation that
modern day women face.

19

Others have recounted the history of the Eugenics movement. See, e.g., PAUL LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS,
NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (2008) [hereinafter LOMBARDO, THREE
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A. Sorting Stock
The Eugenics movement was premised on sorting people into categories of superior and
inferior stock. The basic idea was that society would be improved in a variety of ways if people
of superior stock reproduced more and people of inferior stock reproduced less. Francis Galton
originally coined the term “eugenics” to describe “the science of improving stock . . . to give to
the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less
suitable than they otherwise would have had.”20 In simple terms, eugenics contemplates selective
mating to accelerate the process of natural selection. Galton urged the “‘better classes’ to mate
and breed liberally,” while accepting that the government might have some role to play in
limiting the fertility of those on the lower rungs of society.21
The validity of this premise, of course, depends on a hereditarian understanding of the
transmission of social problems and an ability to distinguish between “superior” and “inferior”
stock. The early twentieth century Eugenicists asserted scientific bases for their theories, relying
on genealogical studies from “hereditary science” of the hereditary character of traits such as
poverty, criminal conduct, laziness, feeblemindedness, and sexual immorality that were found to
cluster in poor families.22 They also tapped into the emerging discipline of genetics, and the

GENERATIONS]; DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY
(1985); ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER BREEDING IN MODERN
AMERICA (2005).
20

Mohapatra, supra note 15, at 53 (citing FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT 17 n.1 (Gavan Tredoux ed., 2d ed. 1907)).
21

LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 19, at 7.

22

Id. at 8–9 (noting that reports were carried in such publications as Scientific American and American Medical
Weekly).
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resulting “coalescing of theories of improving the human race by selective breeding with
scientific discoveries in genetics had a synergistic effect on the eugenics movement.”23 Early
twentieth-century eugenicists believed that most human traits were passed from one generation
to the next as a matter of genetic heredity, and this view received the endorsement of mainstream
scientists and public figures.24 These theories were subsequently discredited and now are often
referred to as “pseudoscientific.”25
B. Public Health, Prejudice, and Policy
The promises of the Eugenics movement sounded laudable. The goals were to promote
public health and mitigate social woes. It also, however, appealed to those who wished to rein in
public responsibility for addressing social ills. In their claimed reliance on scientific bases to
improve society, the Eugenicists included in their camp Progressives who sought “to apply
principles of efficiency to the management of government and to delegate the control of social
welfare programs to a professionally trained class of experts.”26 But these theories, while
claiming a scientific basis, also appealed to and reinforced prejudices in American society.
Scientific theories of racial difference were consistent with eugenic theories: “White Americans
had for over two centuries developed an understanding of the races as biologically distinct

23

JUDITH DAAR, THE NEW EUGENICS: SELECTIVE BREEDING IN AN ERA OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 32
(2017).
24

Id. at 33.

25

Osagie K. Obasogie, More than Love: Eugenics and the Future of Loving v. Virginia, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2795,
2797 (2018) (characterizing eugenics as “utter pseudoscience without merit”). Daar is more generous, but reaches
the same conclusion: “While this rather simple assessment of an area as complex as human nature might strike the
modern mind as wholly ill-supported and ill-advised, at the time it was enticing beyond the frailties of its own
logic.” DAAR, supra note 23, at 33.
26

LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 19, at 17.
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groups, marked by inherited attributes of inferiority and superiority.”27 As one scholar put it,
eugenics was a “quasi-science” that “helped transform the familiar discourses of bigotry and
nativism into biological ‘fact.’”28 The emerging movement struck a chord in White society that
felt threatened by increasing immigration and a Black birth rate that exceeded their own. As
Osagie Obasogie describes a “perception of impending demographic warfare that could lead to
inferior traits flooding the gene pool. … This informed several types of practices that had the
eugenic sensibilities of isolating social groups to prevent the racial dilution of whites.”29
Eugenicists’ theories found fertile ground in state and federal legislatures. The efforts of
the Eugenicists did not stop at encouraging the citizenry to follow practices that would produce
“better babies” to increase the “good stock.” Instead, governments exercised their power to
prevent the replenishment of the “inferior stock.” Invoking the collectivist ethic of public health,
states passed laws that placed burdens on those identified as bearers of unhealthy, dangerous, and
societally expensive traits so that society as a whole might benefit.
The most well known were laws authorizing compulsory surgical sterilization of persons
deemed “defective.” Such laws, which were often accompanied by measures segregating those
persons from society,30 were enacted in thirty-two states.31 They associated social problems like

27

DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 61 (2d
ed. 2017).
28

Laura Appleman, Deviancy, Dependency, and Disability: The Forgotten History of Eugenics and Mass
Incarceration, 68 DUKE L.J. 417, 441 (2018).
29

Obasogie, supra note 25, at 2797–98.

See DAAR, supra note 23, at 43 for a description of Eugenicists’ measures seeking to place inferior stock in
segregated custodial settings known as “colonies” to prevent their mixing with superior stock.
30

31

LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 19, at 293–94.
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poverty, lack of education, and unemployment with physical or mental traits carried by
individuals and sought to eliminate those traits by preventing those folks from reproducing. In
short, they sought to cut off the propagation of hereditary lines believed to be inferior.32 These
laws applied to persons assumed to be feebleminded, degenerate, or otherwise unfit to reproduce
and resulted in the surgical sterilization of approximately 65,000 people in the U.S. between
1907 and 1979.33 Many of the persons sterilized had (or were thought to have) some kind of
disability.34 Harry Laughlin, a leading eugenicist, included in his capacious definition of “the
socially inadequate classes” persons who were (using his terms) feeble-minded, insane, epileptic,
diseased, blind, deaf, deformed, and crippled.35 Although courts in a number of states initially
found compulsory sterilization laws unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s
Eugenical Sterilization Law of 1924 in the notorious decision Buck v. Bell.36 Justice Holmes’
opinion in that case endorsed the Eugenicists’ characterization of state-compelled sterilizations
as pro-social, public health measures, analogizing the intrusion to compulsory vaccination. His
conclusion still echoes today: “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”
The Eugenicists’ conception of “fitness” was not limited to mental and physical
disabilities, drunkenness, poverty, and criminality. It extended to race as well. Eugenic rationales
supported the 1924 federal Immigration Restriction Act. That law responded to an influx of

32

Mohapatra, supra note 15, at 54.

33

DAAR, supra note 23, at 42.

34

See generally LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 19.

35

DAAR, supra note 23, at 43 (quoting HARRY LAUGHLIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 65
(1907)). It also included people who were “criminalistic,” “inebriate,” and “dependent.”
36

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).

13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577227

immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, believed to be more fertile than Americans but of
inferior stock, by stemming the “rising tide of defective germ plasm.”37 President Calvin
Coolidge’s support of the law was frankly eugenic: “America must be kept American [because]
biological laws show . . . that Nordics deteriorate when mixed with other races.”38 Thus,
Eugenicists were concerned not only about preventing the transmission of degenerate conduct or
physical or mental impairment; they also saw the introduction of genes from darker skinned
immigrants as threatening the superiority of the white race.
The concerns about White racial superiority and purity also produced anti-miscegenation
laws in numerous states. Laws prohibiting interracial marriage were not a new product of the
Eugenics era, but traced their origins to the colonial period. After Emancipation and the
Reconstruction, some states had repealed their bans on interracial marriage, but a majority of
states still had such laws by the mid-1920s. The flourishing eugenics movement supplied a
purported public health justification for such bans and thus breathed new life into state efforts to
prevent racial mixing.39 To be clear, these laws were not simply racist attempts to prevent
persons of different races from marrying and thus to enforce racial separation. They also sought
to prevent the “pollution” of the White race that would result from interracial mating, so that the

37

Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive
Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (1996).
38

DAAR, supra note 23, at 36 (quoting DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS 97 (1985)).
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As Daar points out, some states that had repealed their anti-miscegenation laws in the late nineteenth century, only
to adopt new laws during the eugenics movement. Id. at 38.

14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577227

superior White stock might be preserved unsullied. 40 As such, they claimed public health
justifications similar to those cited to support compulsory sterilization laws.
Indeed, on the same day in 1924 that the involuntary sterilization law upheld in Buck v.
Bell was enacted, the Virginia legislature also enacted the Racial Integrity Act.41 According to
Paul Lombardo, notorious “eugenic theorist[] and racial progapandist[]” Harry Laughlin
consulted with the Virginia General Assembly on its 1924 revision of an existing antimiscegenation law, arguing that “interracial mixing was dysgenic, likely to pollute the white
gene pool to the detriment of future generations.”42 Virginia’s law prohibited White people from
marrying persons who were not White, but did not prevent intermarriage by nonwhite persons of
different races. This feature of the Virginia law ultimately revealed its White supremacist
motivation to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held it unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia a half
century after its passage.43
Thus, while a eugenic sterilization law and an anti-miscegenation law may initially
appear unrelated, laws prohibiting Whites from marrying nonwhites and laws authorizing the
involuntary sterilization of people with disabilities (among others) were closely related
historically and exhibit a shared Eugenics ideology. Both types of laws asserted pseudoscientific
public health justifications that sought to connect the social woes of poverty, criminality, and

40

Obasogie, supra note 25; cf. Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to
Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1988) (asserting that the Racial Integrity Act had a “more complex
pedigree” founded on racism and employing eugenic justifications as a “respectable veneer”) [hereinafter
Lombardo, Miscegenation].
41

See Lombardo, Miscegenation, supra note 40.
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LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 19, at 245.
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Obasogie, supra note 25.
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lack of education to disability and race, but that actually reflected social prejudices and attempts
to maintain dominance by the “fittest,” namely non-disabled Whites.
Finally, beyond their legal force, Eugenically inspired laws also carried an expressive
value. These laws acted to devalue and dehumanize people deemed to be of inferior stock. They
departed from the historical and biblical understanding of poverty (that the poor will always be
with us and are fitting subjects of charity), replacing them with an understanding that associated
poverty with biological inferiority, immorality, and degeneracy.44 Thus, nondisabled Whites
claimed not only physical and mental superiority over those whose proliferation they sought to
contain, they also claimed moral superiority. The asserted moral degradation of lesser stock and
races justified, to the minds of the scientific community, lawmakers, and the public, their
segregation—both in terms of preventing marriage and creating “colonies” for the
“feebleminded” and “epileptics.”45 The asserted moral superiority provided grounds for surgical
invasions of the bodies of women and men, depriving them of the ability to have children and
form a family. These laws also demonstrated an acceptance of “state involvement in reproductive
practices,”46 at least for some groups lacking power. In all this thinking, human reproduction—
what we think of in our everyday lives as people having families—was treated in a purely
instrumental fashion. It failed to accord value to either bodily integrity or the human desire to
have children. Professors Michelle Goodwin and Erwin Chemerinsky put it powerfully: “The

44

Michael B. Katz, The Biological Inferiority of the Undeserving Poor, in BEYOND BIOETHICS: TOWARD A NEW
BIOPOLITICS (Osagie I. Obasogie & March Darnovsky eds., 2018).
45

See LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 19, at 12–19 (describing the creation of the Virginia Colony for
the Feebleminded and Epileptics).
46

Obasogie, supra note 25.

16
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577227

state tilled women’s and girls’ bodies like a farmer clears the land, removing offending species in
order to avoid their reoccurrence. In this case, snipping the Fallopian tubes of little girls was
taken as lightly as pruning weeds.”47
Like a noxious weed, the notions regarding sorting stock and public health fostered by
the Eugenics movement have proven difficult to uproot. As the American public became aware
of the Nazi regime’s horrific and eugenically justified programs for the mass murder of people
with disabilities and genocide of Jews, Eugenic philosophy and science became discredited in the
United States as an explicit basis for law and social policy. The apparent formal disavowal of
eugenic policies, however, did not mean that eugenic thinking had been entirely uprooted from
American political and social thinking. As Judith Daar puts it: “Eugenics was discredited as a
matter of social, legal, and medical policy, but its extraction from the hearts and minds of those
who truly believed in the certain heritability of all human traits would prove a long-term
challenge.”48 The belief that some groups are less fit to reproduce or suited for parenthood
persisted well into the second half of the twentieth century and the twenty-first century and
continued to devalue Black and disabled women, as discussed in the next Part.
II. Eugenics 2.0: Contemporary Parallels in the Experiences of Black and Disabled Women
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”
—William Faulkner49
Despite official repudiations of Eugenic laws, Black women and disabled women have
continued to face explicit or implicit pressures to limit their childbearing. Those pressures take
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Michelle Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State, 127 YALE L.J. 1270, 1316 (2018).
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DAAR, supra note 23, at 46–47.
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WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 73 (1st Vintage Int’l ed. 2011).
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varying forms, including programs of less-than-voluntary sterilizations, inducement to use
contraception forms that serve societal ends rather than women’s reproductive preferences,
welfare policies designed to discourage childbearing, institutionalization of women with
disabilities, mass incarceration of Black Americans, and limited access to assisted reproductive
technologies.50 Other scholars, like Dorothy Roberts, have thoroughly explored each of these
topics and their connection to childbearing by Black or disabled women. Thus, I will only briefly
review this work, while connecting how Black women and women with disabilities have faced
these pressures. I do not mean to equate the experiences of these two groups of women.51 But in
several regards they bear some kinship.52 Since both groups have been historically and continue
to be devalued, disempowered, and disenfranchised, the parallels in their experiences deserve
attention.
A. Persistent Stereotypes
Powerful lingering stereotypes shape the landscape in which Black and disabled women
make decisions about having children. Although starkly different in some ways, these
stereotypes convey a shared message. They evoke mental images that link Eugenic precedents to
more contemporary constraints.

50

These types of pressure to limit childbearing have also been experienced by women in other groups, as well as by
men in some instances. Women with disabilities and Black women are not the exclusive objects of the practices
described below. They have disproportionately experienced them, however, to a degree not matched by other
demographics.
51

Indeed, the experiences of individual women within each of these groups may vary widely. But the in-group
sharing of experiences is sufficient to permit speaking of experiences shared within in each group.
52

I also am not here making the argument made in Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness As Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293
(2018). Paul-Emile explores whether being Black in the U.S. might be considered disabling and how doing so would
enable new approaches to race discrimination and structural inequality.
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Women with disabilities are commonly presumed to be sexually unwilling or unable53
and unsuitable for maternity, and therefore unlikely to reproduce.54 Medical providers often
share those unfounded assumptions.55 Women with disabilities, however, are just as likely as
non-disabled women to wish and plan to have children.56 More than 160,000 women with
physical disabilities are estimated to become pregnant annually in the United States,57 and
research indicates parallel rates of motherhood among women with and without psychiatric
disabilities.58
If disabled women are presumed to be devoid of sexual interest or ability, Black women
are often stereotyped as just the opposite. The “jezebel” and the “welfare queen” are among
several stereotypes of Black American women related to sexuality and motherhood identified in
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See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mothers with Disabilities, 33 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 75, 85 (2018).
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See Mary Ann McColl et al., Physician Experiences Providing Primary Care to People with Disabilities, 4
HEALTHCARE POL’Y e129 (2008); Lisa Iezzoni et al., “How did that happen?” Public Responses to Women with
Mobility Disability during Pregnancy, 8 DISABILITY & HEALTH 380 (2017); Leslie P. Francis et al., Women with
Disabilities: Ethics of Access and Accommodation for Infertility Care, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN WOMEN’S
HEALTHCARE: PRAC. & POL’Y 13 (2019).
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Francis et al., supra note 54. As discussed below, however, people with intellectual disability are sometimes
viewed as hypersexual. See infra text accompanying note 146.
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Shandra et al., Planning for motherhood: fertility attitudes, desires and intentions among women with disabilities,
46 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 203 (2014). Women with disabilities, however, tended to be less certain
that they would be able to have children. Id.
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Francis et al., supra note 54 (citing Lisa I. Iezzoni et al., General Health, Health Conditions, and Current
Pregnancy Among U.S. Women with and Without Chronic Physical Disabilities, 7 DISABILITY HEALTH J. 181
(2014)).
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Nicholson et al., Developing the Evidence Base for Families Living with Parental Psychiatric Disabilities:
Crossing the Bridge While We’re Building It, 37 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 157 (2014). Today, women with
intellectual disabilities also bear children at high rates. Susan L Parish et al., Pregnancy Outcomes Among U.S.
Women with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 120 AM. J. ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 433, 434 (2015).
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a recent study.59 Dating from when Black women were enslaved, the “jezebel” stereotype
portrays Black women as “immoral, sexually promiscuous, and sexually available.”60 The
“welfare queen” stereotype conjures the image of a single Black woman who is poor and
uneducated and who procreates copiously to increase her welfare benefits.61 It is of more recent
vintage, but echoes a history that viewed enslaved women as “breeders.”
Despite their divergence, these stereotypes of disabled women and Black women
contribute to startlingly similar effects in constraining both groups’ liberty to bear children.
Moreover, stereotypes of both groups share a conviction that neither Black women nor disabled
women are good mothers. This judgment undergirds policies infringing on their reproductive
liberties, discussed in this Part. In addition, once Black or disabled women have children, it feeds
the excessive willingness of child welfare agencies to remove their children from their custody, a
phenomenon that Part IIC2 highlights.
B. Contemporary Parallels: Interference with Childbearing
1. Biological Interference
After revelations of Nazi Germany’s pursuit of racist and ableist eugenic philosophies to
their logical and horrific ends, the fervor for eugenic social policies in the United States seemed
to lose steam. States largely abandoned their official programs of compulsory eugenic

59

Lisa Rosenthal & Marci Lobel, Stereotypes of Black American Women Related to Sexuality and Motherhood, 40
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 414 (2016). Rosenthal and Lobel’s study finds evidence that stereotypes about Black women
influence how people view Black women and that pregnancy contributes to these stereotypes. The other stereotypes,
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sterilizations.62 But eugenically inspired policies and practices persisted in state sponsorship and
sanction of less overt attempts to keep Black and disabled women from having children. These
included bodily intrusions to limit women’s physical reproductive capacity, like sterilization,
coercive contraception, and compelled abortion.
a. Black Women
In her book, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty,
Dorothy Roberts offers an in-depth and unsparing examination of the manifold ways that Black
women have been robbed of their ability to have children or punished for actually having
children.63 She describes the shocking prevalence of sterilizations performed on Black women
and girls from the 1940s through the 1970s, primarily, but by no means exclusively in the
South.64 Sterilizations performed on persons committed to state institutions reflected lingering
eugenic sentiments directed to women who were both Black and deemed disabled.65 In other
cases, poor Black Medicaid enrollees who had just delivered a baby or who were receiving other
medical care were subjected to hysterectomies without informed consent or medical justification.
These “Mississippi appendectomies,” as Black women in the South dubbed them, were decried

62

The laws authorizing those sterilizations, however, remained on the books in a majority of states into the 1970s.
See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Infertile by Force and Federal Complicity: The Story of Relf v. Weinberger, in WOMAN AND
THE LAW STORIES 188 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman ed. 2011)(noting that 26 states had
eugenics sterilization laws in 1973).
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ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 154.
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Other women of color were targeted for unconsented-to sterilization in other parts of the country. See Ikemoto,
supra note 62, at 196.
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Id. at 89–90.
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by Civil Rights leaders like Fannie Lou Hamer, who herself had been subjected to an
unconsented-to hysterectomy.66
Though not officially based on Eugenics-era laws, these sterilizations were the fruit of the
population-control branch of eugenics philosophy that sought to diminish the economic burden it
believed poor persons imposed on society. Some doctors admitted to acting on a belief that
sterilizing poor women was needed to contain the growth of the welfare rolls,67 or what Paul
Lombardo called “the fiscal logic of sterilization.”68 One South Carolina doctor—the only
obstetrician in his county accepting Medicaid patients—had a policy explicitly conditioning his
delivery of a baby for a welfare recipient with multiple children on her sterilization following the
delivery.69 Nor were these “vigilante population control”70 surgeries outside of mainstream
policy thinking. Legislators in about a half-dozen states proposed measures permitting
compulsory sterilization of women on welfare who were unmarried when they had babies.71
These open but officially unsanctioned sterilization practices72 ultimately prompted a
1973 federal class-action lawsuit with two sisters, Mary Alice and Minnie Relf, among the lead
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Id. at 90–91.
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Id. at 92 (citing GENA COREA, THE HIDDEN MALPRACTICE: HOW AMERICAN MEDICINE TREATS WOMEN AS
PATIENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 180–81 (1977)).
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LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 19, at 247.

ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 92; see also Ikemoto, supra note 62, at 195 (describing providers’ methods of
deception and coercion).
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Ikemoto, supra note 62, at 197.
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Id. at 94.
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As Lisa Ikemoto notes, the unconsented-to sterilizations of the Relf era were not limited to welfare or Medicaid
recipients. Ikemoto, supra note 62, at 195.

22
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577227

plaintiffs.73 Mary Alice and Minnie were two poor Black girls; the younger sister, Minnie, was
also mentally disabled. They were only fourteen and twelve years old respectively when they
were sterilized by a federally funded program in Montgomery, Alabama. According to the
district court opinion, Mary Alice and Minnie Relf were among 100,000 to 150,000 poor women
sterilized annually by programs funded by the federal government.74 Almost half of the women
sterilized were Black,75 and according to the court, “an indefinite number of poor people have
been improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization operation under the threat that various
federally supported welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible
sterilization.”76 The Relf litigation led to regulatory changes heightening the procedural
requirements required for sterilizations provided through federally funded programs, but their
efficacy in ending abusive sterilizations of women of color is unclear.77 Even at the end of the
twentieth century, Black women were disproportionately likely to undergo sterilization as a form
of birth control, as compared to White women.78

73

For a full description of the facts of the Relf litigation, see Ikemoto, supra note 62.
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Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, Relf v. Weinberger, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C.
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Involuntary sterilization has fallen out of favor in recent decades,79 but some judges have
still embraced an approach that restricts poor women’s fertility to accomplish societal ends. In a
number of reported cases, judges have pressured Black women to submit to restrictions on
reproduction as a condition of probation.80 These reports sometimes involve court-ordered
sterilization. More common, though, are cases like Darlene Johnson’s. She was charged with
child abuse in 1991 when a California judge presented her with the choice between a prison
sentence of seven years or a single year in prison with a three-year probation term if she were
implanted with Norplant.81 The judge’s action in Johnson’s case was widely condemned, but her
case was not unique. Judicial “prescriptions” for long-acting reversible contraception (LARC)
have appeared most frequently in cases where low-income minority women face a charge of
child abuse or drug use during pregnancy.82 The idea of trading reproductive freedom for
physical freedom still appeals to some judges. In 2017, a Tennessee judge entered a standing
order that offered inmates a 30-day sentence reduction if they would be implanted with a longacting contraceptive (for women) or undergo a vasectomy (for men).83 Conditioning a woman’s
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freedom on curtailment of her fertility resurrects the strand of eugenics thinking that viewed
compulsory sterilizations as a solution to rampant criminality among the “inferior” classes.
Similarly, social policy discussions have entertained the use of LARC to reduce
childbearing by poor women and girls of color ever since the FDA’s approval of Norplant in
1990. Calls for using Norplant to address social ills followed quickly on the heels of the drug’s
approval, with an editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer explicitly referring to the number of
“Black children living in poverty” and advocating for financial incentives for welfare recipients
to use the implant.84 Outrage by Black leaders prompted a quick apology for the editorial, but the
basic idea lives on. In recent years public health experts have discussed the potential value of
encouraging “at risk” adolescents of color to use long-acting contraceptives like the IUD and
implants, often without mentioning that these forms of birth control, by requiring access to a
physician for removal, shift control from women to physicians.85 These discussions note not only
benefits to the young women from preventing unplanned pregnancies, but also a projected
reduction in Medicaid costs and welfare expenditures.86 The idea has crossed into popular press
outlets as well, producing headlines like “Can the IUD Prevent Poverty, Save Taxpayers
Billions?”87 To be sure, many providers today are committed to empowering women and girls of

84
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color to choose (or not) a method of contraception that best meets their health needs and life
goals, but continuing references to the cost-justification of LARC in terms of government
expenditures avoided88 echo the Eugenicists’ “public health” justifications from a century ago.89
Research into how women are counseled about IUDs specifically has found that providers are
more likely to recommend IUDs to low-income Black and Latina women than to low-income
White women.90 And too few discussions of using LARC to decrease racial disparities in the
rates of unintended pregnancy fully address how the histories of coercive reproductive controls
generally and the paucity of doctors willing and able to remove LARC devices have left women
of color suspicious of these contraceptive methods.91
b. Women with Disabilities
While the contraceptive counselling received by Black women may indicate subtle
eugenic influence, disabled women’s contraceptive usage reflects the paradoxical views of those
women as either non-sexual or unfit to reproduce. Research indicates that women with
disabilities at risk of unplanned pregnancy were likelier than non-disabled women to use less
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See, e.g., Caitlin Parks & Jeffrey F. Peipert, Eliminating Health Disparities in Unintended Pregnancy with LongActing Reversible Contraception (LARC), 214 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 681 (2017) (including maternity
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effective contraception or none at all and were less likely to use highly or moderately effective
forms of non-permanent contraception.92 This research suggests that women with disabilities
receive inadequate support and counselling in making choices about contraceptive options best
suited to their procreative plans. Inadequate family-planning counseling is unsurprising if
providers think disabled women are unlikely to engage in sexual activity.93 At the same time,
high rates of sterilization cut off disabled women’s potential to procreate. Recent studies have
found that the prevalence of sterilization among disabled women was almost double that of nondisabled women.94 In particular, sterilization rates are significantly higher for women with
cognitive disabilities, who also underwent sterilization at a younger age than other women.95
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with intellectual or developmental disabilities. See Justine Wu et al., Use of Reversible Contraceptive Methods
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Of course, women with disabilities have diverse experiences. Those with intellectual
disabilities are likely to face fertility-restricting interventions different from those with physical
or sensory disabilities. Just as Eugenic sterilization policies sought particularly to prevent
“feeble-minded” women from having children,96 today third parties often assert authority to
make decisions regarding reproduction for women with intellectual disabilities, deeming those
women incompetent to decide for themselves.97
Whether and when family members or guardians can choose surgical sterilization for an
intellectually disabled woman is a fraught question. States98 typically require judicial
involvement to protect disabled women from decisions irretrievably and unnecessarily depriving
them of their reproductive capacity and potentially subjecting them to major surgery. Standards
for approving sterilizations vary, typically imposing procedural protections and in some cases
substantive criteria,99 but as recently as 2012 statutes in eleven states authorized involuntary

Although the term “feeble-minded” was used with some imprecision by Eugenicists, it generally referred to the
presence of some kind of mental defect that prevented a person from functioning effectively in society. It was an
umbrella term that, according to one proponent, encompassed “idiots,” “imbeciles,” and “morons.” LOMBARDO,
THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 19, at 4041 (describing work of Henry H. Goddard).
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sterilization for persons with heritable intellectual disabilities.100 Moreover, courts persuaded that
surgical sterilization is a sensible way of protecting against unwanted pregnancy may readily
green light operations on women with intellectual disabilities.101 Sterilization requests, however,
may reflect assumptions about a disabled woman’s ability to parent or be motivated by family
members’ self-interest in making care or supervision easier.102 So too, ableist biases103 and the
stereotypes of intellectually disabled women as sexually threatening and requiring professional
control may influence judges’ decisions.104 As a consequence, a decision about sterilization (or

100

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH
DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 40 (2012).
101

LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, supra note 19, at 267–68. Some states are more stringent in their oversight
when parents seek the sterilization of minor girls with intellectual disabilities, but according to Field and Sanchez,
“courts frequently approve sterilizations of minors and even twelve-year-olds.” FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 98, at
107. As Samuel Bagenstos points out, some of these cases will never make it to court: “If the parents and doctors are
all on board, these sorts of sterilization decisions can easily fly under the radar and evade mechanisms of legal
accountability.” Bagenstos, supra note 15.
See Beverly Horsburgh, Schrodinger’s Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory Sterilization of Welfare Mothers
Deconstructing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income Women
of Color, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 572 (1996)(noting that concerns that parents or guardians may become
responsible for offspring of intellectually disabled women may drive sterilization decisions); cf. Edward Goldman &
Elisabeth Quint, Arguments Against Sterilization of Developmentally Disabled Minors, 26 CHILD NEUROLOGY 654
(2011) (dispelling justifications commonly offered by caregivers for sterilizing a minor with IDD). A controversial
case that raised these issues starkly involved parents of a young girl with profound intellectual and developmental
disabilities who subjected their daughter to a hysterectomy, removal of her breast buds, and high doses of estrogen
meant to stunt her growth. See Alicia Ouellette, Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice and the Rights of Disabled
Children: Lessons from the Ashley X Case, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 2017 (2008); Julia Epstein & Stephen A.
Rosenbaum, Revisiting Ashley X: An Essay on Disabled Bodily Integrity, Sexuality, Dignity, and Family Caregiving,
35 TOURO L. REV. 197 (2019). Their stated justification for these interventions was to reduce their daughter’s
growth and physical development in part so that the parents could continue to care for her in their home as they
aged. The so-called “Ashley treatment” remains controversial, and Patricia Williams has recently explored some of
the issues of gender, disability, race and class raised by the social responses to that case. See Patricia J. Williams,
Babies, Bodies and Buyers, 33 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 11, 20–23 (2016).
102
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Field and Sanchez describe at length the Pennsylvania case of Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994), cert. denied, C.W. ex rel. McKinley v. Wasiek, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995), as “illustrat[ing] that even strict legal
rules cannot and do not ensure unbiased decisionmaking.” FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 98, at 170. See also Powell
& Stein, supra note 10, at 81.
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See Pamela Block, Sexuality, Fertility, and Danger: Twentieth-Century Images of Women with Cognitive
Disabilities, 18 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 239 (2000). In addition, the relative infrequency of sterilizations of
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even the use of non-permanent contraception105) for a woman with an intellectual disability may
not reliably either reflect an unbiased assessment of her best interests or support her reproductive
liberty.106
Echoes of our country’s eugenic past are strongest when a state actor tramples a disabled
woman’s reproductive liberty. Because women with significant intellectual disabilities often
reside in institutional settings, some are effectively in state custody. In these cases, a state agency
may exercise authority to sterilize a woman or even compel an abortion without seeking the
woman’s input.107 In Does ex rel. Tarlow v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the District had no constitutional or legal obligation to consider the wishes of
two women with significant intellectual disabilities in its custody before authorizing elective
abortions of their pregnancies.108 In an opinion written by now-Supreme Court Justice
Kavanaugh, the court rejected any constitutionally based liberty interest held by the women to
have their wishes considered, reasoning that “accepting the wishes of patients who lack (and
have always lacked) the mental capacity to make medical decisions does not make logical sense

intellectually disabled males suggests that gendered assumptions play a role. See Pedro Weisleder, Sterilization for
Individuals with Mental Disabilities: The Other Half of the Equation, 26 CHILD NEUROLOGY 649 (2011).
105

The procedural and substantive protections that apply to third-party proposals to sterilize an intellectually
disabled woman do not generally apply to decisions about non-permanent contraception use, even though the
continuous administration of contraception has the same effect as sterilization. FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 98, at
122.
106

See Robyn M. Powell et al., RE: Menstrual Management for Adolescents with Disabilities, 138 PEDIATRICS
3112A (2016).
107

Field and Sanchez describe cases in which either a state agency, family members, or other guardians have
obtained abortions for pregnant women with intellectual disabilities. See FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 98, at 142–
50. According to them, in 1993, “In most states the question whether a relative or guardian can decide [to terminate
a pregnancy] without judicial supervision remains unanswered.” Id. at 151.
108

489 F.3d 376, 378–81 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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and would cause erroneous medical decisions. . . .”109 Not surprisingly, in invoking “the Nation’s
history and tradition” to reject the plaintiffs’ asserted rights, the opinion did not explicitly
reference the Eugenics-era program of state-compelled sterilizations of “feeble-minded” women.
That history of abuse, however, is sufficiently notorious that an implicit reference may fairly be
construed, leading Mary Anne Case to describe Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion as “implicitly
reaffirming Buck v. Bell.”110
Tarlow maintains that, if medical providers deem a woman with an intellectual disability
to be legally incompetent, her subjective desires to have a child or to avoid sterilization or an
abortion are irrelevant. This binary approach insists that either a disabled woman must fully meet
the legal standard of decisional competency or be deemed fully incompetent.111 This traditional
approach reflects “a thinly disguised substantive agenda”112 that reduces women with intellectual
disabilities to objects of state decision making and disfavors their childbearing. It also rejects a
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Id. at 382. By contrast, the district court had ruled that the District was legally required to try to determine the
wishes of an incompetent patient regarding any elective surgery, including an abortion. See Does v. District of
Columbia, 374 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112–16 (D.D.C. 2005) (preliminary injunction); Does I through III v. District of
Columbia, 232 F.R.D. 18, 25 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Doe ex rel. Tarlow v. D.C., 489
F.3d 376 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (permanent injunction). The appellate court also rejected any obligation to seek input
from the families of the two women.
110

Mary Ann Case, Abortion, the Disabilities of Pregnancy, and the Dignity of Risk,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3366444; see also Bagenstos, supra note 15 (asserting that the
practices upheld in Tarlow exemplify the eugenic practice of “violently denying the reproductive rights of disabled
people”). Discussions of abortion and disability rights more commonly focus on the implications of selective
abortion following the identification of fetal defects via prenatal testing. The tension between disability rights and
reproductive rights advocates around disability-selective abortions and state legislative bans on them is beyond the
scope of this Article, which focuses on constraints on childbearing.
111

Cf. Leslie P. Francis, Understanding Autonomy in Light of Intellectual Disability, in DISABILITY AND
DISADVANTAGE 207–08 (Kimberley Brownlee & Adam Cureton eds., 2009) (making a similar point about all-ornothing approaches to autonomy for persons with intellectual disabilities).
112

FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 98, at 160.
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viable alternative: supported decision making.113 By incorporating counsel from trusted family
members or friends, supported decision-making accords with the feminist theory of relational
autonomy, which “views the individual as embedded within a complex set of relationships.”114
Critically, supported decision making permits the woman whose reproductive path is in question
to retain and exercise her agency to the extent feasible.115
While women with intellectual disabilities face the gravest risk of involuntary fertility
deprivations, women with physical or sensory disabilities also may feel pressure to not have
children. Research reveals that many such women report that, when they became pregnant, their
family or medical providers encouraged them to terminate their pregnancy.116 For disabled
pregnant women, skepticism and hostility regarding their maternal capacity too often replace the
customary congratulations and various forms of social support that non-disabled, White pregnant
women receive.

113

Supported decision-making permits persons with cognitive disability to make decisions for themselves with
trusted friends or family members helping them understand the nature and consequences of a decision. By creating a
state obligation to provide support for the exercise of legal capacity, Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (discussed infra in Part IIIA1) has created momentum behind the alternate approach of
supported decision-making and arguably requires its use for persons with disabilities. See Anna Arstein-Kerslake et
al., Future Directions in Supported Decision-Making, 37 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2017); Powell & Stein, supra note
10, at 76–78.
114

Seema Mohapatra & Lindsay F. Wiley, Feminist Perspectives in Health Law, 47 S4 J.L.MED. & ETHICS 103, 105
(2019).
115

Accord FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 98, at 157–58 (arguing that all persons who can communicate their
preferences should be involved in making decisions about elective medical procedures and only persons “who
literally cannot express their own preferences” should be subject to third-party consent); Anita Silvers & Leslie
Francis, Thinking about the Good: Reconfiguring Liberal Metaphysics (or not) for People with Cognitive
Disabilities, 40 METAPHILOSOPHY 475 (2009).
116

Laura Hershey, Women with Disabilities: Health, Reproduction, and Sexuality, in 1 ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN: GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES AND KNOWLEDGE 385 (Cheris Kramarae et al. eds., 2000);
cf. Carrie Shandra et al., Planning for Motherhood: Fertility Attitudes, Desires and Intentions Among Women with
Disabilities, 46 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 203 (2014) (reporting on studies of disabled women in
Canada and Europe).
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2. Interference through Welfare and Criminal Justice Policies
The preceding discussion considers how societal expectations and state coercion or
compulsion diminish the agency of Black and disabled women to choose contraceptive options
that preserve their choice to have a child. Other policies also have affected the ability of women
in these groups to have children. Policies signaling public unwillingness to provide financial
support for low-income women who bear children or segregating women (and men) in these
groups in institutions, thus limiting their ability to engage in sexual activity, are prime examples.
This Part considers how limitations on welfare benefits, Medicaid policies that push persons with
disabilities into institutions, and the mass incarceration of Black Americans may discourage or
render infeasible the choice to have children.
a. Family Cap Policies
Over their nearly 100-year history, federal-state cash welfare programs have evolved in
conjunction with public attitudes toward impoverished families with children.117 As the number
of families receiving welfare payments rose in the 1960s and 1970s, policies increasingly
focused on getting women receiving welfare into the workforce. In the 1980s, the Reagan
administration birthed the trope of the “welfare queen”—the woman who lived high on the hog
while fraudulently milking the welfare system for benefits. This portrayal of welfare as fostering
dependence among its recipients by eliminating the need to work and as encouraging unmarried
women to have children118 prompted the adoption in the 1980s and 1990s of various policies

This brief history of welfare is drawn from Kelly J. Gastley, Why Family Cap Laws Just Aren’t Getting It Done,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (2004). Eligibility for benefits is generally limited to families where the father was
absent or unable to work.
117

118

Id. at 381.
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seeking to rein in public spending and prune the extent and duration of welfare benefits available
to impoverished women.
These policies included so-called “family cap” and “child exclusion” policies. Though
they are slightly different (the former limited the total assistance a family could receive,
regardless of the number of children in the family, and the latter refused to provide public
assistance to a child who is born to a woman already receiving aid),119 this Article refers to them
collectively as “family cap” policies. States began adopting these policies in the early 1990s, and
Congress’s passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA)120 increased states’ flexibility to implement them.121 During the 1990s and
early 2000s, more than twenty states adopted family cap policies.122
The policies’ ostensible goals were to reduce poverty by discouraging impoverished
women who were receiving welfare from bearing more children.123 A recent analysis concluded
that family cap policies generally failed to reduce additional births. Instead, by denying women
additional benefits for additional children, the policies exacerbated the poverty experienced by
mothers and children, leading to increased housing and food insecurity and poor health
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See FELICIA KORNBLUH & GWENDOLYN MINK, ENSURING POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVE 15 (Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press 2019).
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105.
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See Gastley, supra note 117, at 382. Although PRWORA did not itself impose family cap or child exclusion
policies, it effectively gave states a green light to adopt those policies. Prior to PRWORA, a state seeking to adopt a
child exclusion policy had to seek a waiver from the federal government. Id. at 388–89.
122

Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 173 (2002).
123

ROBERTS, supra note 27, at xvi.
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outcomes.124 But the impact of these policies extends beyond individual families. By
perpetuating families’ poverty, these policies ultimately reinforced their communities’ marginal
status.125 Recognizing their adverse impact on child health, a number of states have repealed
their family cap policies since 2002, but they remain in place in more than a dozen states.126
Most relevant to this Article, family cap policies reified an eugenic logic: namely, that
decreasing public spending on poverty warrants curtailing the fertility of poor women.127
Numerous commentators have pointed out that, although the large majority of welfare recipients
are White, people generally imagine of a woman on welfare as being Black.128 The stereotype of
the manipulative, irresponsible, and sexually promiscuous “welfare queen” that motivated states’

Ctr. on Reprod. Rights & Justice, Bringing Families out of ‘Cap’tivity: The Path Toward Abolishing Welfare
Family Caps, BERKELEY L. (Aug. 2016), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016Caps_FA2.pdf [hereinafter Bringing Families out of ‘Cap’tivity].
124
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Ikemoto, supra note 78, at 7.
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Teresa Wiltz, Family Welfare Caps Lose Favor in More States, PEW (May 3, 2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/05/03/family-welfare-caps-lose-favor-inmore-states (noting that California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey have repealed their caps since 2016).
127

Delfina Martinez-Pandiani, Ineffective Family Cap Policies: The Misdiagnosis and Contributor to Women’s
Poverty, HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.hhpronline.org/articles/2016/11/12/ineffectivefamily-cap-policies-the-misdiagnosis-and-contributor-to-womens-poverty; see also Eric McBurney, So Long as
Lawmakers do not use the N-word: The Maximum Family Grant Example of how the Equal Protection Clause
Protects Racially Discriminatory Laws, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 497 (2011) (tracing the history of racist welfare
policies and arguing that California’s family cap policy reflected an unarticulated “discriminatory intent, based on
stereotypes about the bestial nature of African American female sexuality, to systematically reduce the African
American population”).
See Franklin D. Gilliam Jr., The ‘Welfare Queen’ Experiment, NIEMAN REPORTS, Summer 1999, at 49, 49–50;
ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF THE WELFARE QUEEN 23–24 (2004);
N. Tatiana Masters, Taryn P. Lindhorst & Marcia K. Meyers, Jezebel at the Welfare Office: How Racialized
Stereotypes of Poor Women’s Reproductive Decisions and Relationships Shape Policy Implementation, 18 J.
POVERTY 109 (2014).
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restrictive welfare policies had a Black face.129 As Lisa Ikemoto writes, restrictive welfare
policies effectively “pathologize Black motherhood.”130
This racial tinge to family cap policies is not merely a supposition; it is reflected in states’
policy adoption decisions. A congressional analysis found that states with a higher proportion of
Black welfare recipients were statistically more likely to adopt a family cap policy. By contrast,
states were less likely to adopt a family cap policy if their welfare recipients were mostly
White.131 States’ greater ardor in embracing penalties on childbearing when Black women were
involved is of a piece with recent findings regarding the connection between race and states’
welfare programs more generally. After analyzing variations in states’ welfare spending and
policies relating to the generosity of benefits, behavioral requirements for recipients, and time
limits on welfare, researchers from the Urban Institute concluded that “African American people
are especially and disproportionately concentrated” in states that provide less generous benefits,
restrict recipients’ behavior more stringently, and impose shorter time limits on the receipt of
assistance.132
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KHIARA BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION (2012).
Rosenthal & Lobel, supra note 59; Goodwin & Chemerinsky, supra note 47. In fact, research suggests that families
receiving welfare assistance on average have the same number of children as families in the general population.
Bringing Families out of ‘Cap’tivity, supra note 124, at 2.
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Ikemoto, supra note 78, at 6.
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ROBERTS, supra note 27, at xvi.
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Heather Hahn et al., Why Does Cash Welfare Depend on Where you Live? How and Why State TANF Programs
Vary, 18 URBAN INST. (June 2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/90761/tanf_cash_welfare_0.pdf. The researchers also analyzed
the ratio of families actually receiving TANF benefits to the number of families living in poverty in a state (what
they called the TANF-to-poverty ratio). In 2014, nationwide only 23 families received TANF assistance for every
100 families with children in poverty. Id. at 1. The 25 states with the lowest TANF-to-poverty ratio (meaning the
states that provided assistance to the lowest proportion of their families with children in poverty) were home to 56%
of the Black population, but only 46% of the non-Hispanic White population. Id. at 8.
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For these reasons, scholars and commentators have described family caps as
contemporary eugenics measures.133 Legislators’ thinking in adopting family cap policies echoed
the sentiment that led physicians to condition providing maternity care to poor women on their
“consent” to sterilization.134 As in the early twentieth century, the social good of saving
resources is understood to justify efforts to limit childbearing by poor women of color, without
regard to the humanity and material welfare of those women and the children they bear.
b. Institutionalization of People with Disabilities
Medicaid, another public benefit program rooted in the welfare system, interferes with
some disabled women’s ability to have children. The joint federal-state health insurance program
originally covered a population that largely tracked the recipients of federal income support
payments like AFCD and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).135 As a result, Medicaid came to
be known as “welfare medicine.”
Because it covers a broad range of needed rehabilitative and supportive services as well
as medical care, Medicaid coverage is crucial for many persons with disabilities. That coverage,
though, is structurally biased towards providing services in institutional, rather than community,
settings. The federal Medicaid statute requires state programs to cover care that Medicaid
enrollees receive in institutions. By contrast, covering home and community-based services
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Mutcherson, supra note 80, at S13; Jamelle Bouie, The Most Discriminatory Law in the Land, SLATE (June 17,
2014, 11:47 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/06/the-maximum-family-grant-and-family-caps-a-racistlaw-that-punishes-the-poor.html (“when you situate family caps in the broad history of American policy and
reproductive rights, it’s easy to see the connective tissue between eugenics and benefit cuts to stop ‘illegitimacy’”).
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See supra text accompanying note 69.
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See Frank J. Thompson, Medicaid Rising: The Perils and Potential of Federalism, in MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID AT 50: AMERICA'S ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE AGE OF AFFORDABLE CARE 208
(Alan B. Cohen et al. eds., 2015).
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(HCBS) remains optional for the states.136 Despite decades of (somewhat successful) efforts to
increase opportunities for people with disabilities to live independently in community settings,
the demand for accessible and affordable community-based housing for people with disabilities
still far outstrips the supply.137 And recent threats of disruptions to federal Medicaid funding
raised the prospect that states might be forced to cut existing HCBS programs, forcing many
back into institutions.138
Living in institutional or other congregate settings may severely constrain the ability of
women with disabilities to engage in sexual activity or pursue pregnancy.139 As Laura Hershey
has explained, “[w]omen with disabilities who have access to the resources to live
independently . . . can define their own sexual identity and desires. . . . On the other hand,
disabled women who live in institutions, or with their parents or other family members, may be
severely inhibited in exploring and/or expressing their sexuality.”140 Women with cognitive
disabilities, psychiatric disabilities, or severe physical disabilities are more likely to reside in an

Mary Crossley, Threats to Medicaid and Health Equity Intersections, 12 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 311
(2018).
136
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See generally Jessica Schubel, Medicaid Is Key to Implementing Olmstead’s Community Integration
Requirements for People With Disabilities, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (June 22, 2018, 11:00 AM),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/medicaid-is-key-to-implementing-olmsteads-community-integration-requirements-forpeople-with.
138

Mary Crossley, Community Integration of People with Disabilities, LAWS, 2017, at 22.

In 2011 a group of self-advocates asked to define the characteristics of an “institution” included restrictions on
residents’ sexual activity as one characteristic. Autistic Self Advocacy Network, Keeping the Promise—SelfAdvocates Defining the Meaning of Community (2011), https://autisticadvocacy.org/policy/briefs/keeping-thepromise-self-advocates-defining-the-meaning-of-community-living/.
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Hershey, supra note 116. Hershey lists several ways in which institutional living may limit women’s sexual
freedom, including: “lack of privacy; others’ discomfort with disabled women’s sexuality; homophobia; lack of
access to information about sexuality; lack of access to sexual stimulation devices, birth control devices, or safe-sex
materials; and policies which explicitly restrict sexual activity.” Id.
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institution or some other kind of congregate setting and, thus, to experience these limits.141
Women with intellectual disabilities have expressed frustration at how their families or agencies
providing services limited their social activities with men and forbade them from displaying
physical affection.142
According to Michael Perlin and Allison Lynch, beliefs that sexual activity by persons
with mental disabilities are taboo and immoral produce a lack of respect for those persons’
human right to sexual expression.143 They describe how even professionals working in
institutions for persons with mental disabilities or mental illness deny that their patients are
sexual beings.144 These uninformed and unrealistic views reflect contradictory popular
stereotypes of persons with disabilities. In some contexts, persons with mental disabilities are
expected not to be sexual beings.145 But sometimes a view that they “possess[] an animalistic
hypersexuality” leads to measures “to stop them from acting on these ‘primitive’ urges.”146 The
result is institutional arrangements that act as surveillance techniques, effectively diminishing

“In 2009, 469,123 people [with disabilities] received services and supports while living in state or nonstate
institutions, nursing facilities, small congregate residential settings, and even in their own homes. Another 599,152
received some services and supports while living with their families.” National Council on Disability, Institutions:
Definitions, Populations, and Trends, https://ncd.gov/publications/2012/Sept192012/Institutions (last visited Jan. 24,
2020).
141
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See Donna J. Bernert, Sexuality and Disability in the Lives of Women with Intellectual Disabilities, 29
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 129 (2010) (reporting on ethnography of 14 women with an intellectual disability).
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MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALLISON J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY, AND THE LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER
(2016).
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Id. at 3.
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Id. at 27.
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Id. at 9.
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opportunities for privacy and inhibiting sexual expression.147 Some measures may be justifiable
as protecting persons with intellectual or other disabilities from sexual predation, but others may
be reflexive attempts to prevent all sexual intimacy.148
Critical reflection thus reveals Medicaid’s continued structural bias in favor of
institutional care as implicitly dismissing the procreative interests of women with disabilities. Its
unstated premise is that if society is going to provide services for people with disabilities, it
should do so in settings that prevent them from having sex and having children. Inadequate
support for independent living for women with disabilities—whether cognitive, physical, or
sensory—affects their ability to bear children. While less overt than family cap policies’ explicit
attempt to deter poor women from having children, Medicaid’s institutional bias implicitly
devalues disabled women’s childbearing interests.
c. Mass Incarceration and Black Women
A different sort of institutionalization—mass incarceration—shapes Black women’s
ability to bear children and form families.149 Criminal justice enforcement concentrated in urban
neighborhoods of color, policing focused on drug crimes, and criminal penalties attached to drug
offenses have combined to produce and perpetuate mass incarceration. Michelle Alexander’s
compelling examination of the mass incarceration of Black men reveals a racist and oppressive
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Pierre Pariseau-Legault & Dave Holmes, Mediated pathways, negotiated identities: a critical phenomenological
analysis of the experience of sexuality in the context of intellectual disability, 22 J. RES. NURSING 599 (2017) (giving
doors that do not lock or rooms with only single beds as examples).
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See Jasmine E. Harris, Sexual Consent and Disability, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 480, 497–98 (2018). For some people
with disabilities, legitimate questions exist as to their ability to consent to sexual activity, so that protective measures
may be needed. Rates of sexual violence against people with disabilities are much higher than against non-disabled
people, and persons with intellectual disabilities are particularly likely to be victims. Id. at 491 & n.39.
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James C. Oleson, The New Eugenics: Black Hyper-Incarceration and Human Abatement, 5 SOC. SCI. 66 (2016).
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form of social control akin to Jim Crow laws.150 Jim Crow laws shared the Eugenicists’
commitment to maintaining racial separation and purity. Mass incarceration has a similar
eugenic effect.151
High rates of incarceration of persons from disadvantaged communities may influence
fertility rates in several ways. Courts have held that the constitutionally protected liberty interest
in reproducing is suspended during incarceration;152 thus, a person who is incarcerated cannot
claim a right to have children. Prisons are sex-segregated and may prohibit sexual contact by
inmates with visitors.153 In addition, entanglement in the justice system and incarceration often
coincide with prime childbearing years.154 Sociologist James Oleson concludes that this
combination of factors, combined with disproportionately high incarceration rates for minorities,
may affect reproduction rates.
The modern phenomenon of Black hyper-incarceration has much in common with
the eugenic policies of America’s past. Incapacitation isolates prisoners and . . .
impedes their ability to procreate. Because Black males are hyper-incarcerated . . .
and because Blacks serve longer average felony sentences than whites for most
crimes, overall Black reproduction rates in the non-incarcerated general
population could be depressed. Black hyper-incarceration operates as a
contemporary iteration of an earlier eugenic logic. . . .155
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Many discussions of mass incarceration focus on Black men, who are incarcerated at a
higher rate than Black women. But in 2016 Black women’s incarceration rate doubled that of
White women.156 As a consequence, Black women’s ability to pursue childbearing is
disproportionately limited by carceral segregation. Moreover, Black women living in the
community who seek to have children with Black men face thinned ranks as a result of mass
incarceration.157 Less directly, contact with the criminal justice system—whether their own
involvement or a loved one’s incarceration—may operate as a significant stressor for Black
women, compounding the toxic stress of interpersonal and institutional racism that contributes to
high rates of Black infant mortality.158 Dorothy Roberts puts it bluntly: “A concern for the
incarceration rate of Black men, . . . without attention to the control of Black women’s
reproduction, will miss a critical technique of racial subordination.”159 In Oleson’s words,
“hyper-incarceration . . . could exert a eugenic double effect.”160
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bail. See Aleks Kajstura, Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y INST. (Nov. 13, 2018),
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d. The Eugenic Effect of Institutions
This side-by-side comparison reveals that the persistent institutionalization of persons
with physical and mental disabilities and the mass incarceration of Black men and women have
parallel impacts on the childbearing freedom of women in those groups. Any discussion of the
impact of contemporary institutionalization should attend to its historical precursors:
“Segregation and detention has always served to control those on the margins: the poor . . .
minorities . . . and the disabled.”161 Recall that one aspect of the Eugenicists’ program for
improving and protecting the “superior stock” was to segregate persons deemed unsuitable for
reproduction in “colonies,” where they would be prevented from polluting the germ line of the
preferred group.162 In examining how historical policies for disabled persons shaped the growth
of contemporary mass incarceration, Laura Appleman describes the view that “social problems
including insanity, dependency, and poverty, were fundamentally individual and moral in nature.
Individuals suffering from such complaints could be either cured or isolated from society.”163
Separating women deemed unworthy of motherhood from the rest of society has a long lineage
in our country. Today, disproportionately confining Black women and disabled women to
institutions (whether treatment-focused or carceral) effectively curtails their freedom to have
children.
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Appleman, supra note 28.
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Revisions that occurred to anti-miscegenation laws during the Eugenics era similarly sought to keep nonwhites
from mating with White persons, but without the use of institutional segregation. See supra note 39.
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Appleman, supra note 28.
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3. Barriers to Using Assisted Reproductive Technologies
Sometimes, women who want to have a baby need more than the simple ability to engage
in sexual intercourse. Seeking the assistance of fertility services providers becomes necessary,
either because the woman faces medical infertility or because she wants to have a baby without
being sexually involved with a man. Fertility specialists are less likely to provide services to
Black and disabled women who face infertility, leading commentators to explore how race and
disability affect access to assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). In deciding whether to take
on a prospective patient, fertility specialists may rely on factors that function to screen out
certain groups of women (even if they do not overtly discriminate), and other provider practices
and policies may have a similar effect.164 Viewed in historical context, these decisions and
practices appear disturbingly reminiscent of Eugenics policies.
a. Women With Disabilities
Women with disabilities face compounded challenges when their attempts to become
pregnant are unsuccessful. Infertility is a difficult experience for women generally, and disability
adds distinctive societal challenges. Adoption as an alternative to pregnancy may not be an
option, as adoption agencies often screen out prospective parents with disabilities.165 Forced to
consider ART, disabled women are likely to find inexperienced and biased providers. Medical
education traditionally has failed to supply training and experience involving patients with
disabilities, leaving providers both technically unprepared to address any issues presented by a
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See generally DAAR, supra note 23. As a general matter, physicians working in a private practice setting are free
to decide whether or not to take on new patients. Legal prohibitions on discrimination based on race or disability,
however, may constrain their ability to engage in overt discrimination by picking and choosing patients.
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See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 100, at 181–82 (describing discrimination).
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patient’s disability and, potentially, personally uncomfortable with treating a disabled patient.166
Providers may have concerns that pregnancy might be risky for a disabled woman and fear
heightened risk of liability in the event of an adverse outcome.167 In addition, a provider may
screen out a disabled woman if the provider lacks accessible medical equipment (making
treatment physically inaccessible) or if the woman lacks insurance that covers fertility treatment
(making treatment financially inaccessible). Because disabled women are disproportionately
covered by Medicaid—which typically does not pay for ART—many may lose access for this
reason.168
Moreover, beyond these concerns about a provider’s ability to safely provide and the
patient’s ability to pay for ART services, a different type of worry may dissuade providers from
helping a disabled woman become pregnant. Specifically, misgivings about the appropriateness
of the woman having and parenting a child appropriately may feed fertility specialists’
reluctance.169 In general, fertility specialists consider it appropriate, in screening and treating
patients, to take into account not only the (prospective) patient’s welfare, but also the welfare of
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Francis et al., supra note 54, at 8 (citing W. Mosher et al., Disparities in Receipt of Family Planning Services by
Disability Status: New Estimates from the National Survey of Family Growth, 19 DISABILITY HEALTH J. 394
(2017)).
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Id. at 9–10, 12 (noting that some disabling conditions may in fact increase risks to both the woman and her child,
the authors also point out that the limited data existing “indicate that providers may overestimate risks of pregnancy
in women with disabilities.”).
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Id. Women with disabilities are disproportionately covered by Medicaid because of their low income, and state
Medicaid programs do not cover fertility treatment. Id. at 6. The poverty rate for people with disabilities is almost
30%, according to Census Bureau data, and “women with disabilities have the lowest labor force participation rate
of any demographic group.” Id. at 13.
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See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Disabling Dreams of Parenthood: The Fertility Industry, Anti-discrimination, and
Parents with Disabilities, 27 L. & INEQUALITY 311, 316–17 (2009) (describing survey of screening practices of
assisted reproductive technology programs).

45
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577227

any potentially resulting child.170 And, to the extent those providers lack training and experience
in working with disabled persons, they are likely to entertain widely held biases about how hard
it would be for a disabled woman to raise a child and the resulting risks to a prospective child’s
welfare.
Providers’ concerns about helping disabled women become pregnant must be considered
against a historical background of eugenic prejudice that—with the support of the law—robbed
women with disabilities of their reproductive abilities. Admittedly, contemporary apprehensions
about a woman’s maternal suitability are less likely to be framed as concerns about trait
heritability and more likely to be expressed as skepticism of her ability to perform parenting
tasks. However, any assessment of parental adequacy must be situated in the context of unjust
societal structures that readily offer supports useful to non-disabled parents but fail to meet the
particular needs of disabled parents.171 In short, a provider’s misgivings about a disabled
woman’s parental suitability likely flow from widely held, ableist assumptions about appropriate
parenting and without contemplating how different approaches to parenting may encourage a
child’s flourishing.172
b. Black Women
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Id. at 316.
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Francis et al., supra note 54, at 7 (noting importance of taking into account how different disabilities may affect a
woman’s ability to parent with supports).
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Id. at 12 (citing Adam Cureton, Parents with Disabilities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS
407 (Leslie Francis ed., 2017).
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Barriers may also impede Black women’s receipt of fertility services. Research reveals
stark differences along race and class lines in access to ARTs.173 Although women of color
actually experience medical infertility at rates higher than White women, they are less likely to
seek medical assistance in conceiving and carrying a pregnancy.174 Building on Roberts’ earlier
work,175 Judith Daar’s book The New Eugenics: Selective Breeding in an Era of Reproductive
Technologies, explores several factors that may contribute to this disparity. Black women’s careseeking behaviors may be influenced by both economic barriers (since fertility treatment is quite
expensive and often is not covered by insurance) and cultural and social factors (such as a
heightened stigmatization of infertility in the Black community).176 In addition, a history of
abuses and exploitation by White doctors, particularly in the context of gynecological care,177
engendered Blacks’ continuing distrust of the medical profession, which may help explain
further why fewer Black women experiencing infertility employ ARTs. Evidence suggests that a
woman’s race may influence medical diagnoses of the causes of infertility, leading to Black
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See generally Alicia Armstrong & Torie C. Plowden, Ethnicity and Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 9
CLINICAL PRAC. 651 (2012).
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N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2016), https://search.proquest.com/docview/1790227698?pq-origsite=summon.
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ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 246–93 (chapter titled “Race and the New Reproduction”).
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See Vanessa N. Gamble, Under the Shadow of Tuskegee: African Americans in Health Care, 87 AM. J. OF PUBLIC
HEALTH 1773, 1773 (noting that the Tuskegee syphilis study was but one of many instances of exploitation and
abuse). The history of White male doctors using Black female slaves and, later, free women as unconsenting
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women being steered away from ART.178 For these reasons, Black women who seek fertility
services tend to wait longer to do so. That delay, in turn, may factor into worse outcomes
experienced by Black women who do use ARTs.179 This disparity appears across a range of
outcomes, including lower fertilization rates, lower pregnancy rates, and lower live birth rates.180
The fertility industry and public policy have contributed to White women’s higher usage
of fertility services in other ways. ART providers and policy makers have taken steps to increase
the availability and attractiveness of expensive ARTs for more affluent (mostly White)
women.181 At the same time, the location, marketing, and policies of fertility clinics may all
serve to dampen Black women’s demand for their services. In particular, online marketing for
clinics most often features pictures of White babies as the end “product” being advertised.182 All
these factors contribute to “racially stratified access to reproductive care.”183
As with disabled women’s lower use of ARTs, racial disparities must be considered in
their historical and social context. As Roberts explains, White couples’ enthusiasm for using
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ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 255.
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See Press Release, IVF Treatments not as Successful in African American Women, Am. Society for
Reproductive Medicine, IVF Treatments not as Successful in African American Women (Oct. 8, 2018),
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ARTs reflects the importance they place on the genetic connection between parent and offspring,
which itself is a cultural artifact that flows from the historical emphasis on genetic ties that
sought to “preserve white supremacy through a rule of racial purity.”184 The literature on the
demand for ART services often refers to couples desperate to rear a genetically related child.
That this valorization of genetic connection reflects an impulse towards White racial purity can
be seen in lawsuits against ART providers for mix-ups leading to White parents having nonWhite babies.185 By contrast, Black people tend to be “skeptical about any obsession with genes”
and instead “defin[e] themselves apart from inherited traits. . . . see[ing] group membership as a
political and cultural affiliation.”186 Despite this explanation for the racial disparity in the usage
of ARTs, Roberts still finds it troubling, especially considered in the broader context of efforts to
curtail childbearing by Black women. “What does it mean that we live in a country in which
white women disproportionately undergo expensive technologies to enable them to bear children,
while Black women disproportionately undergo surgery that prevents them from being able to
bear any?”187
C. Contemporary Parallels: Devaluing Maternity
So far, we have seen how formal policies and informal practices, descended from the
Eugenics movement, undermine Black and disabled women’s ability to become pregnant. This
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ROBERTS, supra note 27, at 267.
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See John A. Robertson, Commerce and Regulation in the Assisted Reproduction Industry, in BABY MARKETS:
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Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2017)(describing lawsuit); cf. TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO
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Part turns to considering parallels in their experiences when these women become pregnant and
have a child. Pursuing motherhood exposes women with disabilities and Black women to greater
risks than non-disabled White women and their maternal bonds to greater threats of disruption.
1. Perilous Pregnancy
Rising maternal mortality rates present a significant public health problem. As rates in
other countries decline, the rate of U.S. women who die from pregnancy-related complications is
the highest in the developed world and has been climbing.188 Maternal mortality rates, however,
vary among different demographic groups of women.
a. Women With Disabilities—Medical Risks
If public health researchers have calculated the maternal mortality rate specifically for
women with disabilities, those data are difficult to find. The CDC does indicate that an
increasing number of pregnant women have chronic health conditions, such as hypertension,
diabetes, and chronic heart disease, putting them at higher risk of pregnancy complications and
even death.189 Even without an overall disability-specific maternal mortality rate, evidence exists
suggesting that disabled women face heightened risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth.
Researchers have found that women with diverse disabilities are more likely than non-disabled
women to delay prenatal care, have a preterm birth, deliver by cesarean section, suffer intimate
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Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, U.S. Has the Worst Rate of Maternal Deaths in the Developed World, NPR
(May 12, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/12/528098789/u-s-has-the-worst-rate-of-maternal-deaths-in-thedeveloped-world.
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Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregnancy-mortality-surveillance-system.htm. Cf.
Lisa Iezzoni et al., General Health, Health Conditions, and Current Pregnancy Among U.S. Women with and
without Chronic Physical Disabilities, 7 DISABILITY & HEALTH J. 181 (2014) (survey data suggests that women with
chronic physical disabilities “may have a complex mix of health problems and often experience fair or poor health”).
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partner violence while pregnant, and experience symptoms of postpartum depression.190 Another
study found that women with disabilities were twice as likely to smoke and more likely to
experience a medical complication while pregnant.191 While a risk of dying as a result of
pregnancy is the gravest risk, these risks of avoidable complications and physical and emotional
suffering matter.
This research does not indicate that these heightened risks are the product of disability
itself, but they may be connected to the social and economic stresses that disabled women (and
Black women) frequently experience, along with ableist medical biases and stereotypes. Medical
ignorance attributable to the profession’s relative inattention to the health needs and risk factors
associated with perinatal care for disabled women may also create risks.192 The obstetric
providers from whom disabled pregnant women receive care likely have received no training
specifically relating to providing care for women with mobility or other impairments.193
Research into the experiences of disabled women in the perinatal period is sparse, and clinical
guidelines for their maternity care are lacking.194 Women with physical disabilities have reported
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that many health providers are unprepared to manage their pregnancies and deliveries (including
labor pain) effectively and exhibit negative stereotypes about disabled women bearing
children.195 These negative experiences likely feed into women’s hesitancy to seek care either
during pregnancy or following delivery.196
b. Black Women—Maternal Mortality
The lack of knowledge and support for women with disabilities who bear children is
disturbing, but the risks for pregnant Black women are both graver and more sinister. In
September 2019, the CDC reported that the maternal mortality rate for Black women generally in
the United States is more than three times as high as the rate for White women, and for women
aged thirty or older, the rate is four to five times as high.197 This disparity reflects more than the

Clinical Considerations, 12 J. FOR NURSE PRACTITIONERS 503, 508 (2016) (asserting that “few studies have been
conducted to examine and describe the experience of women with disabilities during the perinatal period.”).
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Monika Mitra et al., A Perinatal Health Framework for Women with Physical Disabilities, 8 DISABILITY HEALTH
J. 499 (2015) (citing studies); Suzanne C. Smeltzer et al., Labor, Delivery, and Anesthesia Experiences of Women
with Physical Disability, 44 BIRTH 315 (2017) (more than half of the physically disabled women surveyed reported
failed epidurals, which generally have a 99% success rate); see also Francis et al., supra note , at 5 (citing Lisa I.
Iezzoni et al., “How did that happen?” Public responses to women with mobility disability during pregnancy, 8
DISABILITY HEALTH J. 380 (2015)). Women with disabilities have also cited the lack of access to a competent
obstetrician as one reason they might be unlikely try to have a child, even though they would like to. See Tina L.
Bloom et al., Fertility Desires and Intentions Among U.S. Women by Disability Status: Findings from the 2011–
2013 National Survey of Family Growth, 21 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J. 1606 (2017). They may also be
deterred by the inability to access disability-specific information about pregnancy and childbirth. Tracey A.
LaPierre, “Paying the price to get there”: Motherhood and the Dynamics of Pregnancy Deliberations Among
Women with Disabilities, 10 DISABILITY & HEALTH J. 419 (July 2017). For an account of disabled women’s
experiences in Canada, see Meghan Collie, Canada’s health-care system isn’t designed for parents with disabilities:
experts, GLOBAL NEWS (Sept. 22, 2019), https://globalnews.ca/news/5925556/parenting-disability/.
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effects of poverty or low socio-economic status disproportionately borne by Black women, as it
persists across class and education levels. Research indicates that numerous factors contribute to
this striking disparity. Those factors include differential access to and quality of health care, as
well as racial bias in the health care system. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists acknowledges that stereotyping and implicit bias can affect the care that Black
patients receive from providers.198 Providers’ failures to listen to Black women and respond to
their concerns may play a role in high rates of maternal mortality and baby loss.199 In her essay
“Dying to be Competent,” sociologist Tressie McMillan Cottom describes how her prematurely
born baby died, after providers failed for three days to recognize her complaints as preterm
labor.200 Moreover, according to the “weathering” hypothesis, the accumulation of repeated
stresses associated with being subjected to discrimination and racism contributes to poorer health
for Black women, which in turn plays a role in their high maternal mortality rates.201 Simply put,
getting pregnant exposes Black women to a much higher risk of death than White women.
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Risks short of death are greater too. Pregnant Black women are more likely to suffer nonlethal negative experiences associated with medical care. Compared to White women, they are
more frequently subjected to verbal mistreatment or to nonconsensual or violent interventions
during pregnancy, childbirth, and the postpartum period.202
c. Black Women—Criminalization of Pregnancy
Prosecutions of pregnant women for alleged harm to their fetuses also threatens the
welfare of pregnant Black women. The umbrella phrase “criminalization of pregnancy”203 covers
prosecutions of pregnant women for a range of behaviors Using illegal drugs while pregnant has
been the most common factual predicate, but actions such as a failure to comply with medical
advice, failure to wear a seatbelt, and attempted suicide all have prompted criminal prosecutions.
Marshae Jones’ 2019 manslaughter indictment offers a recent notorious example of
pregnancy criminalization. Jones, a Black woman, was five months pregnant when she was shot
in the stomach in a fight. The gunshot killed her fetus. Commenting on the case, a local police
detective ignored Jones’ injury, instead treating her as the insurer of her fetus’ welfare: “The
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See Saraswathi Vedam et al., The Giving Voice to Mothers study: inequity and mistreatment during pregnancy
and childbirth in the United States, 16 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 77 (2019); Dana-Ain Davis, Obstetric Racism: The
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is but one aspect of a broader movement to place all responsibility for children’s well being on their mothers. As
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investigation showed that the only true victim in this was the unborn baby . . . . It was the mother
of the child who initiated and continued the fight.”204 Many local residents agreed with this
logic.205 Advocates for pregnant women, by contrast, decried Alabama’s willingness to arrest a
woman who had been injured by gun violence and lost her pregnancy as a result.206 The district
attorney ultimately declined to prosecute the case, without disavowing its legal basis.207 One
commentator noted the implications: “If a pregnant woman . . . can be arrested because she does
not, or cannot, ensure her [own] safety, then all pregnant women are endangered: from mugging
victims (why were you out on that unsafe street so late?) and women who ‘provoke’ their partner
to beat them, to women who have miscarriages because of the physical demands of their jobs.”208
Criminal prosecutions of pregnant women rest on an assortment of legal theories,
including “fetal assault” or “fetal homicide” laws (which recognize fetuses as potential crime
victims) and the designation of substance use during pregnancy (sometimes labeled “chemical
endangerment”) as a form of child abuse.209 These prosecutions first drew public attention in the
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late 1980s, when prosecutors began bringing charges against women who used cocaine during
their pregnancy.210 Since then, prosecutors have pursued increasingly serious charges and
draconian penalties against women,211 and the scourge of the opioid epidemic has kept the
prosecution of pregnant women in the public eye.212 Echoing the geographic concentration of
involuntary sterilizations, a handful of Southern states have prosecuted the most cases.213
And these prosecutions have fallen disproportionately on low-income and Black
women,214 even though “[d]rug use by pregnant women transcends class and racial lines,”215 and
the harmful effects of alcohol or tobacco use on the developing fetus are better established than
those of illegal drug use.216 The precise number of women prosecuted for actions relating to their
pregnancy is unknown,217 but the largest study of cases involving arrests and forced interventions
on pregnant women found that 71% of cases involved women whose income was low enough to
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For a brief history of the criminalization of drug use by pregnant women, see FENTIMAN, supra note 203, at 126–
32.
211

Id. at 131–32.

212

Editorial Board, The Mothers Society Condemns, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018),
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entitle them to indigent defense and 52% involved Black women.218 One explanation for the
exaggerated prosecutorial attention to low-income and Black pregnant women is their reliance
on. publicly funded prenatal care. Poor women’s entanglement in public benefits systems
deprives them of privacy, exposing them to closer scrutiny and greater condemnation than
middle-class women, as Khiara Bridges describes.219
“Fetal interests” or “child welfare” is typically the stated justification for prosecuting
pregnant women. Nearly three decades ago, however, Lisa Ikemoto showed how the invocation
of fetal interests obscures the real impact: the subordination of women.220 Medical and public
health experts warn that criminalizing pregnancy negatively affects the health of women and
their children.221 In many of these cases, however, doctors and nurses – “hospital snitches and
police informants”222 – actively informed law enforcement of drug use by pregnant women.
Awareness of such reporting produces justifiable distrust, which may discourage women from
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seeking prenatal care early in their pregnancy or at all, leading to worse pregnancy outcomes. 223
Providers’ willingness to test pregnant women for drugs without informed consent, betray patient
confidentiality, and align themselves with law enforcement may reflect racist and eugenic
thinking.224 As Dorothy Roberts observed in 1997: “[t]he criminal regulation of pregnancy . . .
belongs to the continuing legacy of the degradation of Black motherhood. . . . The prosecutions
are better understood as a way of punishing Black women for having babies rather than as a way
of protecting Black fetuses.”225
2. Precarious Motherhood
Once they have a child, Black and disabled women face heightened risks of losing
custody of it to the state.226 Either child welfare agencies or the criminal justice system may
intervene and seek removal. Thus, after childbirth, concerns about the criminalization of
pregnancy seamlessly morph into concerns about the criminalization of motherhood. Parenting
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choices that do not mirror idealized or middle-class norms – whether as a result of poverty,
physical or intellectual impairment, cultural factors, or lack of social supports – may lead to a
child’s removal from its mother, with long-lasting impacts on both.227
a. Black Women
Black mothers and Latino mothers appear more likely than White mothers to face unfair
accusations of child abuse and neglect. A public defender paints a chilling picture of how
differently health care workers tend to treat women of color —as compared to White mothers—
when they seek care for a child’s injury.228 Citing to research finding that cases of minor head
trauma are two to four times more likely to be evaluated and reported as possible child abuse
when Black or Hispanic children (as compared to White non-Hispanic children) are brought to
an emergency room, the attorney emphasizes the harm and trauma visited upon children by
unnecessary separation from their families.229 Child welfare agencies and police too easily cite
the child’s safety when criminalizing parenting choices made by low-income women
(predominantly women of color), a practice advocates have nicknamed “Jane Crow.”230 The
broader picture is one where “catching a case”—the common shorthand for being investigated by

See Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Foster Care as Punishment: The New Reality of “Jane
Crow,” N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/nyregion/foster-care-nyc-jane-crow.html
(reporting on interviews with attorneys representing predominately low-income Black and Hispanic women); cf.
Gaia Bernstein & Zvi H. Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221 (2011) (arguing that incorporating
“intensive parenting” practices into legal standards could increase existing biases in the child welfare system).
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a child welfare agency—has become as routine, unjustified, and potentially life altering for
Black mothers as police hyper-surveillance is for Black men and boys.231
Black parents are overrepresented in the child welfare system compared to Whites, with
racial disparities existing in the decisions made at various stages of the child welfare process.232
The reasons are complex and contested, but research indicates that socioeconomic status is the
strongest predictor of child maltreatment, and Black families are disproportionately likely to
have a low socioeconomic status.233 Some scholars assert the more controversial proposition234
that racial bias within the child welfare system plays a role in producing disparities.235 For the
Black mothers whose children are taken from them at disproportionately high rates, however, it
matters little whether the proximate cause is racial bias in the system itself or in social and
economic structures more broadly.
b. Women with Disabilities
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(describing how operations of the prison system and foster care systems intersect to punish Black mothers); but see
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Maintaining custody is similarly not a sure bet for mothers with disabilities, who “face
substantial discrimination in the child welfare system.”236 Ill-informed assumptions about the
capacity of a woman with a physical, psychiatric, or intellectual disability to meet the needs of a
child may be reflected in legal standards questioning her fitness.237 As with many disabilitybased prejudices, these assumptions view the woman’s disability as the only trait relevant to her
parenting ability. Parents with intellectual or psychiatric disabilities face distinctive prejudices
casting them as utterly unable to acquire parenting skills (in the case of intellectual disability)238
or as potential dangers to their children (in the case of psychiatric disability).239 But parents with
sensory or physical disabilities must battle assumptions as well. “[D]eaf parents are thought to be
incapable of effectively stimulating language skills; blind parents cannot provide adequate
attention or discipline; and parents with spinal cord injuries cannot adequately supervise their
children.”240 While these prejudices attach to both fathers and mothers with disabilities, gendered

236
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assumptions about mothers’ primary obligation to physically care for and emotionally nurture
children make them particularly destructive disabled women’s custodial rights.241
Custodial precarity for disabled mothers also reflects a failure by many child welfare
professionals to appreciate the range of parenting supports available to assist a disabled parent—
just as non-disabled parents regularly rely on a range of supports like daycare, tutoring, and
familial involvement.242 The seeming novelty of parenting supports valuable to disabled parents
reflects the widely shared myth that people with disabilities do not become parents.243 Linda
Barclay points out how the “social organization of resources” constrains choices:
Culturally shared schemas about the natural unfitness of disabled people to
participate in work, school, families, politics and society influence the availability
and distribution of resources…. The reduced . . . achievements of disabled people
that predictably flows from lack of access further reinforces those very cultural
schemas that produce a hostile and incommodious environment. It looks like a
natural fact about the world, about disability, that disabled people are incapable of
full participation.244
In short, the apparent relative rarity of disabled parents reinforces the naturalness of (and
preference for) non-disabled parenting modes, which in turn affects the parenting that society
supports.
Even as progress has been made integrating people with disabilities into the community,
these prejudices against disabled mothers have remained remarkably robust. They manifest
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within child welfare agencies and the judicial system and have largely resisted legal
challenges.245 Litigation seeking to use the ADA to compel states to modify their child welfare
services to meet disabled parents’ needs have had only limited success.246 One appellate court,
though, has noted child welfare agencies’ “systemic discrimination”247 against parents with
disabilities and explicitly connected that discrimination with the history of eugenics.248
III. Shared Indignities in a Legal and Human Rights Framework
This Article has traced numerous parallels among societally erected barriers to healthy
motherhood that Black women and women with disabilities have faced, both historically and
today. This Part employs the concept of dignity to attach greater meaning to those parallels. It
briefly explores the meaning of dignity and how that concept provides a unifying framework for
the many ways that Black and disabled women struggle with impediments to their ability to bear
and raise children. Whether they result from state policy or private practices or simply reflect a
lingering residue of historically discriminatory practices, these impediments undermine the
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dignity of Black and disabled women. By making the choice to be a mother unachievable,
impractical, physically dangerous, or unsustainable, they corrode the dignity and equal status of
these women. To be clear, I do not argue that motherhood is in any way essential to women’s
dignity or part of women’s “nature.” Instead, my claim is that women’s ability to freely choose
whether to bear children and be mothers lies at the core of equal personhood and human dignity.
Although dignity enjoys no single clear meaning, the term’s use in human rights documents and
constitutional law offers useful insights regarding the nature of the dignitary harms described in
this Article.
A. Defining Dignity
The concept of dignity is capacious, but vague. It evades attempts at precise definition.
Despite (or perhaps because of) its shape-shifting nature, dignity is commonly invoked as the
basis for making claims in human rights law and U.S. constitutional law.249 The foundational
documents in neither of these realms, however, clearly define what dignity means.
1. Human Rights
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ assertion in 1948 that “All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,”250 dignity has been a central component of
human rights discourse and law. Subsequent human rights documents—and particularly the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)—have given dignity a place of
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central importance.251 These documents seemingly treat dignity as a foundational concept
without defining or explaining it.252 Perhaps drafters of human rights documents thought it
sufficient to leave the term’s meaning to the “intuitive understanding”253 of those responsible for
implementing human rights obligations, but the absence of a shared, clear understanding may sap
the concept of rigor. Without clear meaning, dignity may not function effectively as a foundation
for human rights.254
That said, widely shared conceptions of dignity seem clearly connected to the conditions
necessary for human flourishing.255 In synthesizing writings on dignity and its relevance to
health, Nora Jacobson characterizes human rights documents as “view[ing] the maintenance of
dignity as evidence of the successful protection and promotion of human rights.”256 Both
restrictive and affirmative uses of the term appear in those documents. Restrictive uses protect
human dignity from threats of various kinds, including “unjust attitudes or acts of contempt” and
discrimination. Affirmative uses, by contrast, advance human dignity by requiring that societies
achieve “certain minimum standards.” The constraints on childbearing explored in this Article
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implicate both restrictive and affirmative uses of dignity. Moreover, reflecting on examples of
indignities—instances when people have been denied dignity—may help crystallize the
concept’s meaning.257 Thus, indignities endured by Black and disabled women—women like
Marshae Jones and Mary Moe—may enhance our understanding of what dignity actually
demands.
Indeed, the history of reproductive abuses by the medical profession that Black and
disabled women have endured provides good reason for viewing infringements on childbearing
through a dignity lens.258 The idea that dignity in areas involving reproduction and family
formation is a matter of human rights has spread well beyond legal circles259 to medical
professionals. For example, a recent study examining women’s descriptions of mistreatment they
were subjected to in receiving maternity care drew the connection between “mistreatment,
dignity, and freedom from human rights abuses in maternity care.”260 Similarly, the American
Society of Reproductive Medicine, the leading organization of fertility specialists, describes
creating a family as “a basic human right.”261 Yet, as the parallels described in Part II
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demonstrate, both the state and the medical profession have played roles in perpetuating policies
and practices that degrade, rather than dignify, Black and disabled women.
2. Constitutional Law
The word “dignity” is nowhere to be found in the text of the United States
Constitution,262 but it appears regularly in constitutional law decisions and discussions.
According to Leslie Meltzer Henry’s empirical study of the Supreme Court’s use of the term,
“few concepts dominate modern constitutional jurisprudence more than dignity does without
appearing in the Constitution.”263 Justices have employed the concept in varying ways, without
always being clear about what they are doing. As a result, dignity’s constitutional relevance
remains nebulous and malleable. But Henry’s empirical study offers a typology of Justices’
usage of the term dignity.264 Henry views dignity as “a series of meanings that share a . . . family
resemblance,” rather than a single core concept. She identifies five different, but related, ways
that Justices have used the term,265 each carrying a somewhat different meaning. Henry also
notes how the Justices’ reliance on dignity to explain or justify their conclusions has escalated in
recent decades.
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In particular, dignity has become a handy go-to for courts addressing socially contentious
issues ranging from abortion, to same-sex intimacy and marriage, to the death penalty. In the
early 1990s, the joint authors of Planned Parenthood v. Casey relied on dignity to affirm the
central importance of a person’s freedom to make certain deeply personal decisions:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.266
Casey provides an example of what Meltzer calls “dignity as liberty.” This usage
associates human dignity with individual autonomy, a person’s ability to make choices based on
her understanding of right and wrong and what makes life good, and it requires respect both for
the choice and the chooser. As a matter of substantive due process, the state cannot take from a
person choices “central to personal autonomy and dignity,” including “the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.”267 Thus, the choice of any woman to have a child, even if she is poor and
receives public assistance, reflects her dignity and should be accorded respect.268 This Kantian
conception of dignity, however, inheres only in persons capable of making autonomous
choices—and thus may exclude persons with severe intellectual disabilities. As a consequence,
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reference to “dignity as liberty” may miss the mark as a description of the insult that occurs
when others make choices about reproduction for a woman with a severe intellectual disability.
By contrast, “dignity as equality”—a second meaning identified by Henry that is relevant
to constraints on childbearing—is both universal and permanent. Sometimes, the Justices have
used “dignity” to capture the idea of human beings’ equal worth.269 As such, “dignity as
equality” has an expressive component that animates the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence
and that may acknowledge historical and contemporary hierarchies that have subordinated some
groups, keeping them from fully enjoying recognition of their equal worth.
This reading of “dignity” has figured in racial discrimination cases where the Court has
held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits segregation or anti-miscegenation laws. Because
those laws express a White supremacist message, they undermine the dignity of Blacks. To
support this dignity-based rationale, the Court has relied on the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act, specifically the Senate Commerce Committee’s statement:
The primary purpose of . . . [the Civil Rights Act], then, is to solve this problem,
the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments. Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents,
hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that
a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of
the public because of his race or color.270
William Carter paints a similar picture of the stigmatization and dehumanization experienced by
Blacks who are subjected to racial profiling by law enforcement officials.271 And Neomi Rao has
considered the inextricable connections between “stigma and inferiority” and “the underlying

269

Henry, supra note 263, at 201.

270

Rao, supra note 264, at 263–64.

271

William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 17, 20 (2004).

69
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577227

harms of racial discrimination.” Describing cases like Brown v. Board of Education, she argues
that the Court’s concerns “exhibit sensitivity to the social effects of a long history of legally
enforced discrimination and segregation. . . . In this context, dignity is about recognition of
historical or social struggles . . . and promoting dignity will often require more than formal
equality.”272
Dignity for people with disabilities also entails attention to equality, a point not yet fully
recognized by the Court. Philosopher Linda Barclay makes the point: “Equality is not (just) a
distributive ideal. . . . [It] is also an ideal that governs our relationships to one another and the
way our social and political institutions treat us. In particular, it is an ideal of a society of people
with equal moral worth or status, a rejection of entrenched power and status hierarchies.”273
Thus, ensuring equal dignity for disabled people goes beyond requirements of formally equal
treatment or even reasonable accommodations to encompass a relational aspect. From this
perspective, dignity as equality requires according people with disabilities equal social status and
influence.274 Although the Supreme Court has not fully articulated a robust “dignity as equality”
approach to disability discrimination, Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Tennessee v. Lane275
appears to discern this goal among the ADA’s purposes. In explaining the constitutional validity
of applying the ADA to ensure equal access to state courts, she described Congress’s enactment
of the ADA as “consider[ing] a body of evidence showing that . . . persons with disabilities
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encounter access barriers to public facilities and services. That record . . . sufficed to warrant the
barrier-lowering, dignity-respecting national solution. . . .”276
Although “dignity as liberty” and “dignity as equality” (as Henry describes those
concepts) can be distinguished, they can also be compounded. In some cases involving personal
choices regarding intimate relations and family formation, Justices have simultaneously
deployed and integrated equal protection and substantive due process to protect individual
dignity.277 Most recently, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges278 relied
on the concept of “equal dignity” seemingly to marry equal protection and substantive due
process protections.279 In cases involving women’s reproductive freedoms, however, the Court’s
references to dignity have not linked liberty and equality concerns.280 By focusing only on
“dignity as liberty” (i.e. autonomy) as the basis for abortion rights, for example, the Court has
stranded those rights on a small and eroding island in a sea of neoliberal assumptions about the
nature of autonomy.281 Reading the Fourteenth Amendment to protect only against affirmative
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government interference with women’s choices is a parsimonious view of reproductive liberty
and women’s dignity.282 For a woman desiring to bear and raise a child, this narrow view of
dignity, unencumbered by attention to equality, means that the state has no obligation to do
anything to enable that choice.283 Moreover, other judicial invocations of dignity affirmatively
undermine women’s dignity. In upholding a congressional ban on partial-birth abortion, the
Court characterized the ban as “express[ing] respect for the dignity of human life.”284 This use of
dignity—pushed by religious conservatives seeking to establish fetal personhood—threatens to
subvert the dignity of women.285
B. The Dignity of Childbearing and Mothering
A more robust conception of dignity is needed to protect the procreative interests of
Black and disabled women. Treating privacy rights and substantive equality separately insulates
from legal challenge reproductive controls on women at the intersection of multiple axes of
oppression like gender, race, disability, and class.286 The inadequacy of neoliberal
understandings of choice for advancing the interests of marginalized and resource-deprived
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women has led to the birth of a distinct movement for reproductive justice (RJ) led by women of
color.287 This Part considers how emphasizing dignity as a foundation for infusing equality
concerns into a liberty analysis offers more promise for addressing the injustices examined in
this Article.
Stated simply, policies and practices that regulate or burden childbearing by Black and
disabled women undermine their dignity by expressing an implicit judgment that they are
unacceptable as mothers. The constraints on reproduction described in Part II diminish the
human-ness of these women, just as they have historically. Stereotypes with deep historical roots
persist. Dehumanizing stereotypes of Black women trace their lineage to images of enslaved
women as “breeders”288 without claim to human relationship with their children. In his history of
racist ideas, Ibram X. Kendi quotes from a South Carolina court that, in 1808, ruled that an
enslaved woman stood “on the same footings as other animals” when it came to a legal claim to
her children.289 For disabled women, a presumption of asexuality and an overzealousness in
finding incapacity to make their own decisions perpetuate de-humanizing practices.
The point is that the stakes for Black and disabled women who wish to bear children and
form families is their full and equal membership in the human family, not simply respect for
their autonomous decisions. The equality and liberty aspects of dignity reinforce one another in
these cases. Specifically focusing on Black women, Dorothy Roberts makes this argument at
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some length: “Governmental standards for procreation implicate both equality and privacy
interests by denying human dignity. The right to bear children goes to the heart of what it means
to be human. . . . denying someone the right to bear children—or punishing her for exercising
that right—deprives her of a basic part of her humanity. When this denial is based on race, it also
functions to preserve a racial hierarchy that essentially disregards Black humanity.”290 A parallel
point can be made regarding women with disabilities.291 Certainly, the involuntary sterilization
of a woman because she is disabled denies her ability to choose to have a child. It also speaks
powerfully to the societal denigration of disability. Even policies and practices short of
compelled sterilization infringe on both liberty and equality aspects of disabled women’s dignity;
just consider their segregation in institutional settings that curtail sexual privacy or the binary
competency standard that silences the voices of women not deemed fully competent regarding
reproductive choices.
Dignity attaches to all humans, but its particular meaning may vary for groups and
individuals based on their social settings, life experiences, and capacities.292 Dorothy Roberts
makes the point that the “principle of self-definition has special significance for Black
women.”293 Drawing on the work of Angela Harris, she argues that “Black women’s willful self-
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definition is an adaptation to a history of social denigration.”294 This view sees the dignity of
liberty for this group lying not simply in making choices, but in creating an identity in defiance
of how slavery and its legacy have denied them full personhood. Self-definition and selfdetermination are similarly central commitments of the independent living movement that people
with disabilities started in the 1970s. For women with disabilities, the avoidance of reproductive
controls is an important strand of self-definition.295
Fully respecting women’s dignity requires an expansive understanding of reproductive
liberty that values both substantive equality and individual autonomy rights, but existing
constitutional jurisprudence largely rejects arguments seeking anything more than formal
equality and non-interference. Consequently, it fails to address the multiple ways that the
government, the medical profession, and society more broadly fail to act affirmatively to support
healthy and freely chosen childbearing by Black and disabled women. Recognizing how these
failures reflect hierarchies of race and ability, combined with hierarchies of gender and class,
reveal how they constitute “illegitimate social coercion”296 limiting women’s freedom and
equality.
Dignity offers a conceptual foundation for a more expansive understanding of human
rights documents and the Constitution’s promises of liberty and equal protection.297 In
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considering the role of dignity in human rights documents, Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyo
discerns a link from political and civil rights (like liberty and equality) to economic, social, and
cultural rights, which address the conditions needed for human flourishing.298 These rights oblige
a state to foster respect for marginalized groups.299 Rhonda Magee Andrews goes further.
Rejecting both color-blind and color-conscious proposals as inadequate to address the legacies of
slavery and racialization in the United States, she advocates for adopting a post-racial conception
of human dignity as a guiding principle in interpreting the Constitution. According to Andrews, a
dignity-centered theory of justice requires “an underlying theory of humanity . . . of what it
means to be human.”300 This rich vision of human dignity would address, far better than existing
jurisprudence, the many indignities visited upon Black and disabled women who wish to have
children.
IV. Fueling Solidarity
By disparaging their worth and negatively affecting their health, decisions to have
children, and ability to form families, restraints on childbearing and mothering by Black and
disabled women corrode human dignity. Despite the failure of existing constitutional doctrine—
with its crabbed conceptions of autonomy and formal equality—to address these indignities,
appreciating the parallels described in this Article may enrich theoretical arguments attacking
reproductive injustice. It may also further social movement alignments that seek to rectify
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injustices by bringing women with disabilities more fully into the RJ movement. Finally, the
sense of solidarity arising from the recognition of connections among the reproductive injustices
experienced by Black and disabled women may itself support women’s dignity. This Part
contemplates the potential pay-off from the Article’s descriptive work.
A. Strengthening the Theoretical Germ Line
Early twentieth-century Eugenicists—and their contemporary sympathizers—argued for
maintaining genetic purity in order to produce superior people. Scientists today, however,
recognize that genetic diversity makes a population more resistant to disease and adaptable to
changing circumstances.301 So too with the vigor of ideas and theories. Bringing differing
theoretical perspectives to bear on reproductive indignities may enhance understanding and
result in more robust theoretical frameworks and arguments.302 For decades, feminist disability
theorists have developed a rich feedback loop with both critical race theory and disability theory,
informing and being informed by their attention to social construction, embodiment, and power
dynamics. But while the RJ and disability rights movements “share important affinities”303 in
their attention to how social structures shape individual choices, the sharing of intellectual
ammunition between critical race theorists and disability theorists has been more limited.
Bringing together critical race, disability, and feminist perspectives to address
reproductive indignities helps advance an understanding of individual women’s experiences and
group experiences that is simultaneously more nuanced and more comprehensive than any single

301

Forschungsverbund Berlin, Genetic diversity helps protect against disease, SCI. DAILY (May 23, 2018),
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/05/180523133324.htm.
302

Cf. Ikemoto, supra note 78, at 3.

303

Bagenstos, supra note 15, at 6.

77
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577227

theoretical lens permits. Just as feminist theory describes reproductive constraints as a form of
social control meant to sustain patriarchy, critical race theory views them as perpetuating White
supremacy.304 Similarly, disability theory describes how reproductive controls reflect ableist
systems of power and privilege.305 Viewing them from multiple perspectives reveals the
reproductive controls described in this Article as rife with intersectionality.306 They are the
products of overlapping and intersecting systems of power and oppression that value some
women’s reproduction, but debase others’, producing a system of “stratified reproduction.”307
Dismantling controls on childbearing and child-rearing by Black and disabled women will
require the most powerful, precisely fashioned tools available.308
B. Fostering Social Movement Alignments
Moving from theory to activism, recognizing parallels in the reproductive indignities
suffered by Black and disabled women may catalyze coalition building. As noted above, the RJ
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movement seeks to advance women’s liberty to have children and raise those children.309 RJ
leaders take an explicitly intersectional approach, rallying women of color, low-income women,
indigenous women, immigrant women, and queer persons under the movement’s banner. Its
inclusion of women with disabilities, however, has been inconsistent, as some leaders within the
RJ movement have acknowledged.310 Enhanced understanding of how their experiences are
similar to other marginalized women’s experiences may help ensure that disabled women are not
marginalized within the RJ movement.
Dorothy Roberts and Sujatha Jesudason describe an example of an RJ coalition-building
effort, testing their hypothesis that an intersectional framework permits activists from different
groups to first confront their differences openly and honestly, and then to identify their
“similarities and common values.”311 They detail how RJ activists and disability rights leaders
came together for a series of convenings and roundtable conversations that were critical to crossmovement mobilization: “Rather than erasing our identities for the sake of coalition, we
learn[ed] from each other’s perspective to understand how systems of privilege and disadvantage
operate together and, therefore, to be better equipped to dismantle them.”312 This case study
reinforces the potential value of RJ’s attending to disability in both theorizing and organizing.313
Similarly, it suggests the importance of more deliberate, thoughtful, and consistent inclusion of
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people of color, persons who identify as LGBTQ and members of other marginalized groups by
leaders of disability rights organizations.
Cross-movement alliances working on specific issues offer several advantages. Beyond
the obvious value of building strength in numbers, coordination among movements may provide
a tactical advantage by disturbing the settled expectations and tactics of those seeking to preserve
entrenched power structures.314 On a more profound level, a key lesson from Roberts’ and
Jesudason’s work is that revealing the commonalities among people subject to interlocking
systems of disadvantage – while also acknowledging and explicating the differences in their
experiences – provides an opportunity to create solidarity.315 “Only through the sharing and
exchange of ideas and experiences can the needs of all women be acknowledged and
addressed.”316
The concept of solidarity as a basis for other-regarding actions has emerged in the
literature regarding healthcare and bioethics317 and provides a helpful lens for thinking about the
connections between dignity and reproductive justice and the value of explicating parallel
experiences. Philosopher Carol Gould has recently argued for a broad understanding of solidarity
that can extend beyond a willingness to assist others whom one recognizes as being similar in a

314

SHERRILYN IFILL ET AL., A PERILOUS PATH: TALKING RACE, INEQUALITY, AND THE LAW 79 (2018) (“Being able
to make the connections to the way in which oppression works similarly across different boundaries, really can
allow you to do your finest work. And it confuses the enemy. It really confuses the other side.”); cf. Luna & Luker,
supra note 11, at 342 (“Achieving RJ would require strong coalitions that can move toward long-term change
irrespective of the current political climate.”).
315

Roberts & Jesudason, supra note 15, at 313.

316

SILLIMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 295.

317

The concept is also employed in other contexts, particularly in labor movements.

80
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577227

relevant respect318 to encompass the processes by which people who share an interest on
overcoming structural injustice work together to do so.319 Its connection to justice distinguishes
Gould’s conception of solidarity from charity, and its action orientation distinguishes it from
empathy.320
Gould also connects solidarity’s requirements of acting in support of others—what others
have referred to as “strong solidarity”—to the concept of human dignity embodied in human
rights documents.321 Her account of solidarity, linked as it is to solidarity in the labor movement
and other social movements, entails not simply empathy in understanding another’s plight, but
action (or at least a readiness to act) in support of others to address exploitation and injustice.
Solidarity among groups—like among Black and disabled women—does not imply the erasure
of a group’s particular concerns or require absolute coordination of action. “[D]ifferent
subgroups act to realize [their shared] goals in ways they themselves determine and they liaise or
link up with each other to decide how each group can best participate and contribute.”322 This
description reflects the approach of the diverse groups that have been coordinating activity to
promote social justice for women under the banner of reproductive justice.
This Article’s explication of parallels between the childbearing injustices experienced by
women with disabilities and Black women in the United States supports the fostering of
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solidarity in both the forms that Gould describes. Certainly, even without the parallels that I
trace, Black women and women with disabilities might well share an interest in addressing the
structural injustices that have subordinated women and deprived them of reproductive rights. But
the illumination of experiences that, if not shared, are at least similar in a relevant respect, can
bolster the formation of solidarity.
The nurturing of solidarity may itself be a practice that enhances dignity in both its
human rights and constitutional dimensions.323 Goodwin and Chemerinsky describe how
contextualizing the circumstances of poor women’s lives, rather than defaulting to stereotypes
that have been enshrined in legal precedent, confers dignity on those women.324 So too may
understanding the shared and parallel experiences I have described. Gould describes how actions
taken in solidarity can serve to solidify participants’ understanding of their interdependence in
pursuing goals held in common, which gives rise to a sense of reciprocity.325 Perhaps capturing
this idea the best, Magee Andrews, in arguing for human dignity as a guiding principle in
interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments, describes “a notion of humanity based on our
underlying interconnectedness and the indivisible commonality we share as human beings.”326
V. Conclusion
Nearly a century ago, adherents of the Eugenics movement in the United States shaped
laws and policies in ways that explicitly sought to limit childbearing by persons deemed
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unworthy and unfit for reproduction. The heyday of the Eugenics movement can be measured in
years, but its pseudoscientific philosophy tapped into centuries-old prejudices. Moreover, its
judgments about the propriety of seeking to limit childbearing by “unsuitable” mothers continues
to inform policies and practices today, albeit less overtly. Those policies and practices curtail the
reproductive freedom and undermine the human dignity of many marginalized women. This
Article has highlighted in particular the numerous ways in which the experiences of Black
women and women with disabilities parallel each other. From excessive rates of sterilization and
coerced use of long-acting contraception, to disincentives attached to public benefits and
involuntary institutionalization, Black women, disabled women, and Black disabled women are
more likely to encounter impediments to becoming pregnant than are White non-disabled
women. Moreover, even when they become pregnant, these women face greater risks associated
with having a child and a higher chance the state will take their child from them. And while
persons from other marginalized groups may face similar obstacles to creating and maintaining a
family, the similarities between Black women and disabled women are particularly striking.
Policies and practices that implicitly send the message that a woman should not have a
child denigrate her humanity. Thus, these eugenically tinged infringements on reproductive
freedoms undermine the human dignity of Black and disabled women. Similarities in the
experiences of women in these two groups are not simply a matter of curiosity, however. Instead,
they supply concrete evidence of the interlocking systems of power and privilege highlighted by
the reproductive justice movement. Understanding the parallels among the reproductive
indignities endured by Black and disabled women illuminates their intersectional character and
thus pours a foundation for strengthening solidarity and fostering stronger alliances in support of
reproductive justice.
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